Differentiating the Corporation: Accountability and International Humanitarian Law by Hughes, David
Michigan Journal of International Law 
Volume 42 Issue 1 
2021 
Differentiating the Corporation: Accountability and International 
Humanitarian Law 
David Hughes 
University of Ottawa Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the International Humanitarian Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David Hughes, Differentiating the Corporation: Accountability and International Humanitarian Law, 42 
MICH. J. INT'L L. 47 (2020). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol42/iss1/3 
https://doi.org/10.36642/mjil.42.1.differentiating 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of 
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
47
DIFFERENTIATING THE CORPORATION: 




Imagine the following scenario: A mid-sized South American state re-
tains the services of a private military contractor (“PMC”) to aid in its dec-
ade-long fight against a transnational narco-trafficking organization. A rou-
tine reconnaissance mission is disrupted by members of a small Hoxhaist-
liberation group. Mistaking the PMC for the local military, the rebels fire a 
rocket-propelled grenade towards the convoy. Responding, the contractors 
pursue. Drawn away from their intended route, the PMC comes under fur-
ther attack. They radio for assistance. Members of the PMC, 35-miles away, 
board a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter that was recently procured from a 
private aviation leasing company headquartered in Glendale, Arizona. Sup-
port arrives, but the rebels have dispersed throughout a rural village. The 
helicopter circles. Someone in the village, obscured in the shadows between 
two buildings, fires upwards. A member of the PMC locates the individual 
and from a side-mounted machine gun returns a volley of bullets. The target 
is killed alongside three civilians who had sought refuge within a nearby 
building.
Two weeks later and 300 miles away, representatives of an Antwerp 
based agricultural conglomerate arrive in the Capital to facilitate the expan-
sion of a palm oil plantation. Government officials from the Office of Busi-
ness Development believe that the now heavily regulated Asian market, 
where much of the world’s palm oil production originates, no longer meets 
international demand. A ten-year plan, approved by Parliament, expands the 
industry and positions the state to become the largest global exporter of 
palm oil in the region. The Belgian corporation holds a thirty-five percent 
stake in the operations and will support efforts to expand production facili-
ties. The desired growth, however, requires expansive deforestation in a re-
gion of the country that is the site of a low-intensity armed conflict between 
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the military and a large indigenous population that have long sought auton-
omous self-rule. Resistance by a coalition of environmentalists, human 
rights groups, and armed fighters from the indigenous community is antici-
pated. The Belgian delegation and representatives from the Office of Busi-
ness Development reach an informal agreement. The Government will en-
sure that the agribusiness receives unimpeded access to the required land 
and will guarantee that any militant activities are instantly suppressed.
In 1970, Milton Friedman pronounced that the sole social responsibility 
of business is to increase profit.
1
In the above hypothetical, several entities 
act dutifully. The PMC that assumes a kinetic role, the company that repur-
poses and leases decommissioned military vehicles, and the transnational 
corporation that seeks to expand within a profitable market all prioritize 
earnings. Each demonstrates little regard towards, or awareness of, the host 
state’s constituents’ interests. International law balances the desire to pro-
vide investor protection with efforts to safeguard against corporate complic-
ity in egregious human rights violations and international crimes.
2
But do 
the above activities raise particular concerns that are derived from interna-
tional humanitarian law (“IHL”)?
IHL—the body of international law that endeavors to limit the effects of 
warfare, protect individuals not participating in hostilities, and designate 
how force is used—applies in all instances of armed conflict.
3
Accountabil-
ity for violations of IHL is traditionally attributed to states and to individu-
als.
4
The contributions of corporate actors also come within the auspices of 
IHL. Despite the proliferation of legal initiatives and literature addressing 
the human rights obligations of businesses, IHL’s applicability to corporate 
1. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profit,
N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 13, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-
friedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html.
2. See generally Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations 
and Human Rights, 20 BERK. J. INT’L L. 45 (2002). See also Steven R. Ratner, Corporations 
and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001).
3. See generally YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW 
OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT (3d ed., 2010); see also MARCO SASSÒLI,
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES, CONTROVERSIES, AND SOLUTIONS TO 
PROBLEMS ARISING IN WARFARE (2019); EMILY CRAWFORD & ALISON PERT,
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2015).
4. 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW VOL 2: PRACTICE 3507–12,
3606–10 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) (detailing rules 149 
and 151 within the ICRC’s customary International Humanitarian Law (“IHL”) study which 
assess responsibility for violation of IHL by states and individuals respectively); see also
DALE STEPHENS, ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AND THE QUESTION 
OF THE EFFICACY OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN AMELIORATING VIOLENCE IN 
ARMED CONFLICT, IN ACCOUNTABILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF TIM MCCORMACK 177, 179, 188  fn. 52, 197 
(Jadranka Petrovic ed., 2017); Gentian Zyberi, Enforcement of International Humanitarian 
Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS, TRIBUNALS, AND COURTS 390–91, 
395 (Gerd Oberleitner, ed., 2018).
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entities that operate within conflict zones has received minimal attention.
5
The emphasis on human rights considerations is essential. However, it is 
neither proportionate to the frequency with which corporations operate 
within conflict zones nor does it reflect, perhaps, the “more certain founda-
tion” upon which norms derived from IHL directly bind the operations of 
corporations or their officials.
6
But how are these operations assessed and regulated? In the described 
scenario surely the culpability of the PMC differs from that of the aviation 
leasing firm which, in turn, differs from the agribusiness. How does interna-
tional law treat these disparate forms of corporate conduct when the impli-
cated behavior occurs within a conflict zone? And how do the occurrent ac-
countability challenges differ from those similar limitations commonly 
associated with state responsibility?
This article considers the particularities that affect how accountability is 
imposed for corporate behavior that implicates IHL. I ask: Do existing ac-
countability frameworks—the amalgamation of the primary rules that inter-
national law imposes upon corporate actors and the secondary rules that de-
termine and implement the consequences of a primary breach—adequately 
regulate corporations whose behavior implicates international humanitarian 
law? I suggest that despite the prevalence of familiar impediments and en-
forcement challenges, accountability is further compromised by two fea-
tures distinctive to corporations. The applicable legal framework inade-
quately conceptualizes both the form of corporations and the operational 
nature of corporate activity. These features differentiate the corporation 
from the state. Collectively, they present particular regulatory questions; 
questions that remain under-conceptualized by the patchwork of legal re-
gimes initially designed to ensure accountability for the conduct of states 
and their representatives and that are now applied to a variety of non-state 
actors.
The significance of these questions is clear. Corporations wield enor-
mous power. Accelerated by the era of globalization, their supply chains 
stretch across the world and they exert vast influence over both domestic 
and international politics.
7
A recent list of the one hundred largest revenue-
generating entities contains twenty-nine states and seventy-one corpora-
tions.
8
Notwithstanding the ability of these organizations to generate wealth, 
5. Simon Chesterman, Lawyers, Guns, and Money: The Governance of Business Ac-
tivities in Conflict Zones, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 321, 324–25 (2011) (suggesting that the current 
emphasis results from the prominence and dynamism of human rights and the relative con-
servatism of IHL as a discipline).
6. Id.
7. See Simon Chesterman, Oil and Water: Regulating the Behavior of Multinational 
Corporations Through Law, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 307, 307-308 (2004).
8. Milan Babic, Eelke Heemskerk & Jan Fichtner, Who is More Powerful – States or 
Corporations?, CONVERSATION (July 10, 2018), https://theconversation.com/who-is-more-
powerful-states-or-corporations-99616.
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drive employment, innovation, and economic growth, corporations also pos-
sess the capacity to cause significant harm.
This is particularly acute during instances of armed conflict.
9
Following 
the Second World War, the United States asserted that the culpability of
German industrialists equaled that of the state.
10
As William Schabas re-
minds, many IHL violations would not occur but for the contributions of 
arms dealers, diamond traders, bankers, and financiers.
11
By fueling the war 
effort in Western Europe, with the extraction of wealth from the world’s
most vulnerable landscapes, and through the supply of personnel and wea-
ponry to employ force under the cloak of privatization, business entities are 
immersed in the conduct and continuance of conflict. But how does the na-
ture of the corporation pose specific challenges to a regulatory framework 
that developed in reaction to state conduct? How is corporate activity evolv-
ing to affect IHL in previously unforeseen ways? And how do we most effi-
caciously conceptualize a relationship between the corporation and IHL that 
both reaffirms old questions and presents new regulatory challenges?
This article has three purposes. First, within section II, I describe the 
doctrinal methods through which accountability for corporate conduct im-
plicating IHL may be pursued. The section tells of the emergence of a 
piecemeal framework. Under this framework accountability for corporate 
conduct is achieved indirectly, through secondary rules imposed by separate 
doctrinal forms.
12
International criminal law (“ICL”), international human 
rights law (“IHRL”), and domestic legislation and courts each provide a po-
tential means of securing accountability for violations of IHL. These bodies 
of law all extend to the actions of corporations. But these legal fields—
collectively, the attempt to regulate corporate conduct—are hampered in 
specific ways when they extend beyond the state and to the corporation. 
Corporations have gained international legal status through a succession of 
developments. Advancements in corporate responsibility, however, have re-
sulted in a mismatch between the primary rules that purport to govern busi-
ness conduct, the secondary rules through which regulatory efforts are im-
plemented, and the nature of and the manner in which corporate entities 
operate within conflict zones.
9. U.N. Human Rights Council [“HRC”], Business and Human Rights in Conflict-
Affected Regions: Challenges and Options Towards State Responses ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/HRC
/17/32 (May 27, 2011) (featuring John Ruggie stating that the most egregious rights violations 
occur in conflict environments where legal regimes cannot be expected to function as intend-
ed).
10. See Answer of the United States Prosecution to the Motion on Behalf of the De-
fendant Gustav Krupp von Bohlen, United States v. Krupp (The Krupp Case), 9 T.W.C. 1 
(Nov. 12, 1945).
11. William A. Schabas, Enforcing International Humanitarian Law: Catching the Ac-
complices, 83 INT. REV. RED CROSS 439, 441 (2001).
12. See Ratner, supra note 2, at 481 (clarifying the distinction between the existence of 
a responsibility imposed by international law and the various means through which this re-
sponsibility may be implemented).
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This results in accountability gaps. This article’s second purpose is to 
identify features that contribute to these gaps. Section III describes how de-
spite the capacity of the relevant doctrinal forms to impose accountability in 
particular scenarios, the development of the primary and secondary rules 
regulating corporate conduct exhibit structural limitations. Limitations in 
the legal frameworks governing the conduct of hostilities are familiar. The 
extent to which these have allowed states to operate with impunity is well-
documented and the subject of ongoing reform.
13
The gradual development 
of a regulatory framework, intended to treat corporate activity occurring 
within conflict zones and affecting IHL, however, exhibits particular vul-
nerabilities that are the subject of this article. This section describes: (i) 
structural challenges that complicate the transference of state-based frame-
works to corporations and (ii) how the resulting accountability processes 
have failed to adequately consider, and are thus adversely affected by, par-
ticular features of the corporate form.
This article’s final purpose is to offer a more complete understanding of 
divergent business operations that often occur beyond the conceptual 
boundaries of the relevant legal frameworks. Accordingly, section IV con-
siders the nature of corporate operations. Through a series of case studies, I 
consider how varied forms of corporate behavior elude treatment and affect 
IHL. Often, the implicated conduct is uncontemplated by existing legal 
frameworks. New technologies and corporate innovation present novel chal-
lenges. Efforts to ensure accountability for corporate behavior must begin 
by more fully conceptualizing the ways that corporate conduct can affect 
IHL-based norms. This section presents three broad categorizations of cor-
porate activity that implicate IHL: as a direct violator, as a facilitator, or as 
an incidental contributor.
Corporate activities, occurring within a conflict zone and implicating 
IHL, exhibit a range of moral and legal culpabilities. The ability of the ex-
isting frameworks to treat these forms of corporate conduct decreases as the 
proximity between the corporation and the violation widens. However, the 
distance between conduct and consequence does not lessen the extent that 
norms derived from IHL are affected by these varied, emerging, forms of 
corporate behavior. Collectively, as corporations continue to gain legal sta-
tus, the prospect of ensuring accountability dwindles when the applied 
frameworks fail to fully envision both the nature of a corporation and the 
extent of its activities. Part five concludes.
To narrow the existing accountability gaps, we must begin by aligning 
conceptualizations of corporate conduct and a more accurate conception of 
the corporate form with an encompassing notion of accountability that ex-
ceeds the confines of the existing doctrinal prescriptions. Whether limited 
13. See EMANUELA-CHIARA GILLARD, PROMOTING COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 2–5 (Oct. 2016), https:// www.chathamhouse.org/sites
/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-10-05-promoting-compliance-ihl-gill ard.pdf.
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by a lack of identifiable law or an inability to enforce existing law, regulato-
ry efforts must better reflect the contours of the debates they seek to affect. 
Rarely does the corporation pull the trigger, dig the mass grave, or promote 
the elimination of a group. History shows they are more likely to finance the 
purchase of the gun, manufacture the shovel, or idle while the propaganda 
resonates. Yet paradigms are shifting. Corporations are engaging in new ac-
tivities, affecting international humanitarian law in unforeseen ways. While 
international law has moved from its state-centric origins, assessments of
corporate conduct remain bound by the confines of the various doctrinal 
forms, those primary and secondary rules, through which accountability is 
pursued.
II.  Indirect Accountability for Corporate Violations of IHL
International law imposes rights and duties upon corporations. Notwith-
standing the intricacies of debates regarding legal subjecthood or personali-
ty, various fields of international law increasingly and incrementally extend 
to corporations.
14
IHL binds all actors whose activities are closely linked to 
armed conflict.
15
States and organized armed groups do bear the greatest re-
sponsibility for implementing IHL, but a business entity whose activities are 
closely linked to an armed conflict is required to respect relevant legal pre-
cepts.
16
Commentators diverge on whether these obligations extend to legal 
or natural persons. Assuming a more conservative stance, Emanuela-Chiara 
Gillard suggests that businesses are not, per se, bound by IHL.17 Instead, 
Gillard opines that while businesses are not formally bound, individual staff 
are required to comply with IHL. This is because IHL applies to organized 
armed groups and thus individuals. Gillard concludes that, by analogy, the 
well-established principle of individual responsibility extends to both those 
14. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory 
Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 179 (Apr. 11); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 70–71 (1986) (directly recognizing that corpora-
tions are subjects of international law); José E. Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of In-
ternational Law?, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2001) (noting that the extension of per-
sonhood to corporations carries unintended risks); ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS 
OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 78–79 (2006) (arguing in favor of recognizing the lim-
ited legal personality of corporations).
15. INT’L COMM. RED CROSS [“ICRC”], BUSINESS AND INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 14 (2006), https://www.icrc.org
/en/publication/0882-business-and-international-humanitarian-law-introduction-rights-and-
obligations [hereinafter ICRC BUSINESS AND IHL].
16. Id.
17. See Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, The Position with Regard to International Humani-
tarian Law, 100 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 129, 130–31 (suggesting also that states may im-
pose IHL-based obligations on businesses through domestic mechanisms meaning that while 
businesses would not be bound at the international level, IHL can inform domestic obligations 
that are extended to businesses).
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present within an armed conflict—members of armed groups; civilians; aid 
workers; in-country business staff—and to those not physically present but 
whose activities may violate IHL.
18
The International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) presents a 
more expansive position. IHL, they contend, grants protections to business 
personnel (provided they do not partake in hostilities) and to the assets and 
capital investments of the business enterprise.
19
Equally, IHL imposes obli-
gations on business staff and on the business itself that exposes both the 
natural and legal person to the risk of criminal or civil liability.
20
Accountability for conduct implicating IHL is, however, realized indi-
rectly. In response to violations by both states and corporations, accounta-
bility is implemented through a separate doctrinal form: international crimi-
nal law; international human rights law; and through domestic legislation 
and courts. Here, I employ the notion of accountability broadly. It is used in 
its fullest sense—as both imposing obligations that inform assessments of 
culpability and prescribing consequences for breaches of those standards.
21
Consequences may be legal (e.g., judicial remedy) or non-legal (e.g., reputa-
tional costs; moral opprobrium). They may also be individual (criminal) or 
collective (civil).
22
This article, however, limits its scope to forms of legal 
accountability. This should not be read as under-appreciating the potential 
of non-legal redress. Such means of pursuing accountability are of particular 
relevance to corporations but will only be touched on throughout the article. 
The decision to narrow considerations is instead intended to maintain focus 
on the development and limited scope of the formal legal frameworks.
18. Id. at 131.
19. See ICRC BUSINESS AND IHL, supra note 15, at 7; Protocol Additional to the Ge-
neva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Interna-
tional Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 51(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (stating that 
“civilians shall enjoy protection against the dangers arising from military operations unless 
and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.” Protections alter should the corpora-
tion become a direct participant or unlawful combatant) (hereinafter First Additional Proto-
col).
20. ICRC BUSINESS AND IHL, supra note 15, at 7.
21. See Jutta Brunnée, International Legal Accountability Through the Lens of the Law 
of State Responsibility, 36 NETH. Y.B. INT’L. L. 3, 6 (2005) (describing international legal 
accountability as “the legal justification of an international actor’s performance vis-à-viothers, 
the assessment or judgment of that performance against international legal standards, and the 
possible imposition of consequences if the actor fails to live up to applicable legal standards”)
(emphasis omitted); see also André Nollkaemper, Responsibility of Transnational Corpora-
tions in International Environmental Law: Three Perspectives, in MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE 
OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: PERSPECTIVES FROM SCIENCE, SOCIOLOGY AND THE 
LAW 179, 182 (Gerd Winter, ed., 2010) (discussing the use of “responsibility” to describe ob-
ligations).
22. See STEVEN R. RATNER, JASON S. ABRAMS & JAMES L. BISCHOFF,
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE 
NUREMBERG LEGACY 3 (3d ed., 2009).
54 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 42:47
Under these frameworks, whether accountability is assessed against le-
gal or natural persons varies amongst and remains a contested legal ques-
tion.
23
An encompassing notion of accountability that extends beyond the 
individual to the business entity is desirable and likely constitutes a general 
principle of law.
24
Yet, the contours of this debate do not affect present con-
siderations and thus need not be settled here. Instead, the following sections 
consider how these frameworks have evolved to regulate corporate conduct.
A. International Criminal Law
Lord Holt, in an unnamed decision from 1701, declared that “a corpora-
tion is not indictable, but the particular members of it are.”
25
The maxim so-
cietas delinquere non potest portends the once commonplace view that cor-
porations lack the requisite mens rea to commit a crime.26 This informed the 
Nuremberg Tribunal and the emerging tenet of individual responsibility. In 
the Goering case, the Tribunal claimed that “crimes against international 
law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing 
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law 
be enforced.”
27
The Nuremberg Charter extended the Tribunal’s jurisdiction 
to the representatives of groups and organizations implicated in the war ef-
fort.
28
In the I.G. Farben case, the U.S. Military Tribunal held that “it can no 
longer be questioned that the criminal sanctions of international law are ap-
plicable to private individuals.”
29
In three formative cases, leading German 
industrialists were prosecuted for the commission of crimes against peace, 
war crimes, and for crimes against humanity.
30
The extension of international criminal liability to corporations edged 
forward. Diplomatic discussions, during the establishment of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (“ICTY
/ICTR”) and at the Rome Conference, produced a familiar admixture. States 
23. See DESISLAVA EMANOUUILOVA STOITCHKOVA, TOWARDS CORPORATE 
LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 95 (2010).
24. See Ratner, supra note 2, at 461 (providing a strong normative account of why cor-
porate liability should extend beyond individual responsibility).
25. Anonymous Case No. 935 (1701), 88 Eng. Rep. 1518, 1518 (KB).
26. See Thomas J. Bernard, The Historical Development of Corporate Criminal Liabil-
ity, 22 CRIMINOLOGY 3, 8 (1984); see also WILLIAM SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 211 (5th ed. 2017).
27. France et al. v. Goering et al., 22 I.M.T. 203, 447 (1946) (hereinafter Goering 
Case).
28. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the Eu-
ropean Axis, Charter, art. 9, opened for signature Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter 
IMT Statute].
29. United States v. Carl Krauch et al., (I.G. Farben Case), 8 T.W.C. 1081, 1136 
(1948).
30. Id.; See also United States v. Flick (The Flick Case), 6 T.W.C. 1202 (1997); United 
States v. Krupp (The Krupp Case), 9 T.W.C. 1, 1–2 (1997).
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resisted formalizing corporate criminal responsibility but signaled a desire 
to apply ICL to particular actions by legal persons.
31
When the French dele-
gation proposed that the Statute of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”)
include a modest provision assessing corporate liability, the initiative gar-
nered notable support. Ultimately, a congruence of practical limitations and 
domestic differences precluded delegates from agreeing to an appropriate 
formulation.
32
The post-war ICL tribunals have all held corporate officials liable for 
atrocity crimes.
33
The trials of the German industrialists signified the inter-
national community’s intent to look beyond the state structure.
34
Article 
25(1) of the Rome Statute is read to extend the Court’s jurisdiction to non-
state actors but only imposes responsibility on natural persons.
35
The Office 
of the Prosecutor has repeatedly indicated willingness to investigate corpo-
rate officials.
36
And the ICTR, in the Media Case, convicted three employ-
ees of Radio Télévision des Mille Collines of genocide.37
31. See U.N. Secretary-General., Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Para-
graph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) (in 
which delegates briefly considered extending International Criminal Law (“ICL”) to the con-
duct of criminal persons during discussions to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY”). Although the Secretary General stated that this was desira-
ble, the initiative was rejected in favor of concentrating the Tribunal’s jurisdiction on the ac-
tions of natural persons). See also Alex Batesmith, Corporate Criminal Responsibility for War 
Crimes and other Violations of International Humanitarian Law: The Impact of the Business 
and Human Rights Movement, in CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO THE LAWS OF WAR:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR PETER ROWE 285, 290 (Caroline Harvey, James Summers 
& Nigel D. White eds., 2014).
32. See JAMES GOBERT & MAURICE PUNCH, RETHINKING CORPORATE CRIME 165 
(2003); JERNEJ LETNAR ERNI , HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND BUSINESS: CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 145 (2010) (noting that the French 
proposal would have limited liability to private corporations in which corporate liability could 
be linked to the individual criminal responsibility of one of the corporation’s leading mem-
bers).
33. Julia Graff, Corporate War Criminals and the International Criminal Court: Blood
and Profits in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 23, 23 (2004).
34. See United States v. Carl Krauch et al., (I.G. Farben Case), 8 T.W.C. 1081, 1136 
(1948); see also Krupp, 9 T.W.C. 1; United Kingdom v. Tesch (The Zyklon B Case), Case
No. 9, 1 L.R.T.W.C. 93 (1946).
35. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25(1), July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90; see also Caroline Kaeb, The Shifting Sands of Corporate Liability Under 
International Criminal Law, 49 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 351, 374–75 (2016).
36. See Batesmith, supra note 31, at 292 (citing the Prosecutor’s general intent to look 
at the involvement of corporate officials); see also Press Release, International Criminal 
Court, Prosecutor Receives Referral of Situation in Democratic Republic of Congo, U.N. 
Press Release L/3067 (Apr. 19, 2004) (indicating willingness to investigate the role of private 
actors in the extractive industry that were accused of facilitating conflict in the Ituri Province 
of the Democratic Republic of Congo); Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-373, Decision 
on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ¶ 22 
(Jan. 23, 2012) (in which Joshua Sang, a broadcaster at a radio station, was indicted as an in-
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David Scheffer, the U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues 
who led the American delegation at the Rome Conference, has detailed “an 
increasing acceptance of corporate criminal liability in the almost two dec-
ades since the Rome Treaty was completed.”
38
The Malabo Protocol will, if 
adopted, extend the jurisdiction of the proposed African Criminal Court to 
legal persons that are accused of committing an array of war crimes.
39
The 
Appeals Panel of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (“STL”) held that the 
Court may proceed against a media company that had been accused of con-
tempt.
40
In a comprehensive judgement, the STL interrogated the historical 
record. It held that the Goering pronouncement—that crimes were commit-
ted by natural persons—was merely obiter.
41
U.N. resolutions were consult-
ed. Domestic legislation from forty-four countries was surveyed.
42
Read col-
lectively, the Appeals Panel contended that corporate criminal liability was 
“on the verge of attaining, at the very least, the status of a general principle 
of law applicable under international law.”
43
This status is further evidenced in several international treaties. The 
Apartheid Convention extends criminal liability to both institutions and in-
dividuals.
44
The illegal movement of hazardous waste is labelled an offence 
when committed by either legal or natural persons under the Basel Conven-
tion.
45
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s
(“OECD”) Anti-Bribery Convention obliges states to impose criminal liabil-
direct co-perpetrator of crimes against humanity for his role on the post-election violence in 
Kenya).
37. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 1096, 
1113–14 (Nov. 28, 2007); see also Kaeb, supra note 35 at 375–76.
38. Brief of Ambassador David J. Scheffer, Northwestern University Pritzker School of 
Law, as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 6, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. 
Ct. 1386 (2018) (No. 16-499) [hereinafter Scheffer Brief].
39. Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Jus-
tice and Human Rights art. 46I, adopted June 27, 2014, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties
/36398-treaty-0045__protocol_on_amendments_to_the_protocol_on_the_statute_of_ 
the_african_court_of_justice_and_human_rights_e.pdf.
40. See Prosecutor v. New TV S.A.L., Case No. STL-14-05/PT/AP/AR126.1, Decision 
on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Personal Jurisdiction in Contempt Proceedings (Oct. 2, 
2014).
41. Id. ¶ 64.
42. Manuel J. Ventura, The Prosecution of Corporations Before a Hybrid International 
Criminal Tribunal: The New TV and Akhbar Beirut Contempt Jurisdiction Decisions of the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 1 AFR. J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 71, 75–76 (2016).
43. New TV S.A.L., Case No. STL-14-05/PT/AP/AR126.1 ¶ 67.
44. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid art. 1(2), adopted Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force July 18, 
1976).
45. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and Their Disposal art. 2(14), opened for signature Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 51.
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ity on legal persons that attempt to induce public officials.
46
In the Conven-
tion on Action Against Trafficking, the Council of Europe requires parties 
to ensure that corporations are made criminally liable for violations of the 
treaty’s provisions.
47
And the U.N.’s Convention Against Transnational Or-
ganized Crime defines a series of international offences that are applied to 
both natural and legal persons.
48
The criminalization of particular forms of corporate behavior—
trafficking, environmental derogation, and corruption—offer a foundation 
from which liability for IHL violations logically extends. Accordingly, An-
drew Clapham suggests that there are “no theoretical barriers to subjecting 
corporate war crimes to the developed international criminal legal order de-
signed to tackle violations of international humanitarian law and interna-
tional human rights law.”
49
Existing legal mechanisms have begun to do this 
work. The International Law Commission’s (“ILC”) Draft Articles on 
Crimes Against Humanity require that “each state shall take measures, 
where appropriate, to establish the liability of legal persons. . .”
50
Remedies 
for corporate involvement in the most egregious breaches of IHL are pro-
vided in the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights 
Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law.
51
Account-
ability is provided through reparations where a person, legal person, or other 
entity is found liable for a gross violation of IHL.
52
B. International Human Rights Law
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), in its pream-
ble, extends the common standards contained within its text to “individuals 
46. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [“OECD”] Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions art. 
2, opened for signature Dec. 17, 1997, 2802 U.N.T.S. 225.
47. Council of Europe, Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings 
art. 22, opened for signature Feb. 1, 2008, C.E.T.S. No. 197, 2569 U.N.T.S. 33.
48. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime arts. 5–6, 
opened for signature Nov. 15, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209.
49. Andrew Clapham, The Question of Jurisdiction Under International Criminal Law 
Over Legal Persons: Lessons from the Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court,
in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 139, 178 
(Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000).
50. Int’l Law Comm’n, Crimes Against Humanity: Texts and Titles of the Draft Pre-
amble, the Draft Articles and the Draft Annex Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting Commit-
tee on First Reading, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.892, art. 6 ¶ 7 (May 26, 2017).
51. See G.A. Res. 60/147, annex, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law 
and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, ¶ 3(c) (Mar. 21, 2006).
52. Id. ¶ 15.
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and every organ of society.”
53
This prompted Louis Henkin’s oft-cited con-
tention that this encompassing formulation “excluded no one, no company, 
no market, no cyberspace.”
54
Yet, at least formally, the major human rights 
instruments that built upon the UDHR did not recognize legal persons as ei-
ther the bearers or subjects of rights.
55
Evolution was gradual. Well-publicized events in the 1970s—the in-
volvement of foreign corporations in Central and South American coups;
corporate officials that bribed states to receive lucrative military contracts—
encouraged efforts to regulate corporate conduct through international legal 
mechanisms.
56
The United Nations, following the establishment of the Cen-
tre for Transnational Corporations, and the OECD both produced non-
binding, draft codes of corporate behavior.
57
Initially, however, human 
rights considerations were indirect. The OECD guidelines, for example, de-
sired creation of a “level playing field” for companies operating in territo-
ries where opportunities to accrue advantage through unregulated business 
practices are widespread.
58
This prompted criticisms that the OECD had 
privileged investor rights above public interests.
59
Early U.N. initiatives, 
built around an ambitious redistributive agenda that began in the Global 
53. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights pmbl. ¶ 10 (Dec. 10, 
1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
54. Louis Henkin, The Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global Mar-
kets, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 17, 25 (1999); see also Stephens, supra note 2, at 77.
55. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights pmbl., Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights pmbl., Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]; see also Silvia Steininger 
& Jochen von Bernstorff, Who Turned Multinational Corprations into Bearers of Human 
Rights? On the Creation of Corporate “Human” Rights in International Law, 25 MPIL
RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 1, 5–6 (2018).
56. See Ratner, supra note 2, at 457 (noting that early impetus was derived from the 
role that United Fruit Company and International Telephone and Telegraph played in efforts 
to destabilize governments in Guatemala and Chile); see CLAPHAM, supra note 14, at 201 (al-
so citing events in Chile as well as Lockheed’s payment of bribes to Japanese officials as mo-
tivating the OECD’s efforts to address corporate conduct); James Salzman, Labour Rights,
Globalization and Institutions: The Role and Influence of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 769, 788 (2000).
57. See Econ. and Soc. Council, Rep. on the Special Session of the Comm. on 
Trans’at’l Corps. Supp. No. 7, U.N. Doc. E/1983/17/Rev.1, annex II (1983); OECD, Declara-
tion on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, OECD/LEGAL/0144, annex 1 
(1976), reprinted in THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 
57 (1994); see also Ratner, supra note 2, at 457.
58. See CLAPHAM, supra note 14, at 204; see also OECD, THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 31 (2011) (The Revised Guidelines (2001) would, however, 
include direct reference to human rights considerations).
59. John Ruggie & Tamaryn Nelson, Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Mul-
tinational Enterprises: Normative Innovations and Implementation Challenges 2 (Harv. Ken-
nedy Sch., Working Paper No. 15-045, 2015).
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South, failed to garner consensus and became mired in Cold War bipolari-
ty.
60
In 1977, the International Labour Organization (“ILO”) adopted the 
Tripartite Declaration of Principles.
61
Unlike other soft law initiatives that 
preceded it, the ILO Declaration was perceived as reflecting an appropriate 
balance between governmental, industry, and workers’ interests.
62
It explic-
itly held that all parties “should respect the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the corresponding International Covenants adopted by the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations.”
63
Through its subsequent amend-
ments, the ILO Declaration promoted labor rights, as articulated in various 
human rights instruments, and extended (soft) legal duties to corporations.
64
An array of voluntary declarations followed. As private initiatives, 
through international organizations, and at the behest of various states, these 
instruments offered broad affirmations of human rights principles.
65
Mo-
mentum built. At the World Economic Forum in 1999, Kofi Annan an-
nounced the U.N. Global Compact.
66
This non-binding initiative compels 
businesses to support and respect the protection of internationally pro-
claimed human rights and avoid complicity in human rights abuses.
67
60. See Economic and Social Council Res. 1913 (LVII) (Dec. 5 1974); see also Sey-
more J. Rubin, Developments in the Law and Institutions of International Economic Rela-
tions: Reflections Concerning the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corpora-
tions, 70 AM. J. INT’L L. 73; John Gerrard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving 
International Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 819, 819 (2007); Branislav Gosovic & John Gerard 
Ruggie, On the Creation of a New International Economic Order: Issue Linkage and the Sev-
enth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, 30 INT’L ORG. 309 (1976).
61. Declaration Adopted by the Governing Body of the International Labour Office at 
Its 204th Session (Nov. 1977), reprinted in Official Bulletin, at 49–56, Vol. LXI, Series A 
(1978) [hereinafter ILO Declaration].
62. See Ratner, supra note 2, at 486.
63. ILO Declaration, supra note 61, ¶ 8.
64. Ratner, supra note 2, at 487.
65. Alongside the state-initiated codes drafted by the U.N., OECD, and International 
Labor Organization (“ILO”), a series of other initiatives were formalized between the 1970s 
and 1990s. See e.g., Sullivan Principles for U.S. Corporations Operating in South Africa, 24 
INT’L L. MAT. 1496, 1496–99 (1985); The MacBride Principles, by Father Sean McManus, 
President, Irish National Causus, December 1997, U. MINN. HUM. RTS. LIBR.,
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/links/macbride.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2020); Resolution on EU 
Standards for European Enterprises Operating in Developing Countries: Towards a European 
Code of Conduct, 1998 O.J. (C 104) 180; Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Volunta’y “Model 
Business Princip’es” Issued by the Clinton Administration (May 26, 1995), Daily Rep. For 
Executives. For a detailed account of such initiatives, see Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, Promoting 
International Respect for Worker Rights through Business Code of Conduct, 17 FORDHAM 
INT’L L. J. 1 (1993); see also Stephens, supra note 2, at 79–80.
66. U.N. Secretary General, Kofi Annan’s Address to World Economic Forum in Da-
vos (Feb. 1, 1999), https://www.un.org/sg/en/content /sg/speeches/1999-02-01/kofi-annans-
address-world-economic-forum-davos.
67. U.N. Global Compact, The Ten Principles of the U.N. Global Compact, princs. 1–
2, https://www.unglobal compact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles.
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Concurrently, the U.N. Sub-Commission on Human Rights began draft-
ing the Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and Oth-
er Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights.
68
Proponents of the 
Norms viewed self-regulation as ineffectual and, potentially, as harmful.
69
The draft Norms read like a treaty.
70
They contained twenty-three articles 
detailing an array of human rights obligations—civil and political, social 
and economic, consumer protection, and environmental—pertinent to busi-
ness entities.
71
The Norms, more comprehensive than preceding initiatives, 
were positioned as a binding legal document. Ultimately, the Norms failed 
to garner sufficient state and corporate support and were not adopted by the 
Human Rights Commission.
72
Their influence is, nevertheless, enduring. Unlike many of the preced-
ing rights-based initiatives, the Norms explicitly consider business entities 
that operate within conflict zones. The draft’s preamble acknowledges that 
business enterprises are obligated to respect norms contained within a pleth-
ora of international agreements including the Geneva Conventions.
73
Corpo-
rations may not engage in or benefit from atrocity crimes.
74
IHL informs 
numerous articles that address the security of persons, forced labor, work-
er’s rights, and child protection.
75
These references address the contexts that 
prompted many of the early legal initiatives that sought to regulate the hu-
man rights implications of business practice. Rarely, however, did these in-
clusions explicitly recognize the potential of legal persons to benefit from or 
perpetuate conflict.
The international community continued to pursue accountability initia-
tives that would address the relationship between business entities and hu-
man rights. After the Secretary General appointed John Ruggie as Special 
Representative on the issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corpora-
tions, the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(“UNGP”) were formulated with a strong intergovernmental mandate. Prin-
68. See Ioan Maxim (Rapporteur), Rep. of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Dis-
crimination and Protection of Minorities on Its Fiftieth Session, Res. 1998/8, U.N. Doc. E
/CN.4/1999/4-E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/45 (Sept. 30, 1998).
69. See id.; see also S. Prakash Sethi & Donald H. Schepers, United Nations Global 
Compact: The Promise-Performance Gap, 122 J. BUS. ETHICS 193, 206–07 (2014).
70. Ruggie, supra note 60, at 820.
71. See U.N. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN
/.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003) [hereinafter U.N. Norms].
72. See U.N. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations 
and Related Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN/.4/Dec
/2004/116 (Apr. 22, 2004); see also Ruggie, supra note 60, at 821.
73. See U.N. Norms, supra note 71, pmbl.
74. Id. art. 3.
75. Id. arts. 3, 5–7 (each article notes the relevancy of IHL in relation to specific provi-
sions that address security and worker’s rights).
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ciple 7 recognizes that the risk of human rights abuses is heightened within 
conflict-affected areas and calls upon states to ensure that businesses do not 
contribute to such abuses.
76
The commentary to Principle 12 holds that 
business operations within an armed conflict “should respect the standards 
of international humanitarian law.”
77
Questions remain regarding how, and the extent to which, IHRL-
derived duties can be transposed to further ensure corporate accountability.
78
Accountability initiatives, like the in-progress Legally Binding Instrument 
to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transna-
tional Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, are increasingly mind-
ful of the challenges posed by armed conflict to the business and human 
rights relationship.
79
Civil society initiatives complement intergovernmental 
efforts to redress harmful business activities.
80
And the UNGP’s operation-
alization process has increased attention on the challenges of conducting 
business in conflict-affected areas.
81
76. John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Hu-
man Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises), Guiding Princi-
ples on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework, princ. 7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Aug. 7, 2008) [hereinafter U.N. Guid-
ing Principles].
77. See Off. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts. (OHCHR), Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04, at 13–14 (2011), 
https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf.
78. See Ratner, supra note 2, at 492–97.
79. See e.g., U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in Inter-
national Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises (July 16, 2018), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/ HRCouncil
/WGTransCorp/Session3/DraftLBI.pdf (in which the revised draft treaty builds upon the ap-
peals to IHL contained within the UNGP).
80. See e.g., OECD, OECD Risk Awareness Tool for Multinational Enterprises in 
Weak Governance Zones (2006), https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/corporateresponsibility
/36885821.pdf; Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, https://www.voluntary
principles.org/the-principles/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2020); The Kimberley Process, https:// 
www.kimberleyprocess.com (last visited Sept. 27, 2020); U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT,
GUIDANCE ON RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND HIGH-RISK AREAS
(2010), https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/Peace_and_ Business/Guidance_
RB.pdf; YADAIRA ORSINI & ROPER CLELAND, HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE IN 
CONFLICT-AFFECTED SETTINGS (2018), https://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files
/Economy_Human%20RightsDueDiligenceGuidance_ EN_2018.pdf; SHIFT, HUMAN RIGHTS 
DUE DILIGENCE IN HIGH RISK CIRCUMSTANCES (2015), https://shiftproject.org/resource/ hu-
man-rights-due-diligence-in-high-risk-circumstances.
81. John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Hu-
man Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises), Business and 
Human Rights in Conflict-Affected Regions: Challenges and Options Towards State Respons-
es, U.N. Doc. A/HR/17/32 (May 27, 2011) [hereinafter Special Representative Report 2011].
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C. Domestic Legislation and Courts
Accountability for violations of IHL relies upon domestic enforcement 
mechanisms.
82
The Geneva Conventions require states parties to incorporate 
IHL standards into domestic law.
83
This inclusion envisioned that national 
courts would assume a significant role in regulating the conduct of actors 
engaged in armed conflict.
84
Many states initially lacked the necessary legis-
lative foundation to address IHL violations.
85
However, following adoption 
of the Rome Statute, states amended their criminal codes to include interna-
tional crimes within domestic legislation.
86
Comprehensive legislative and 
jurisprudential frameworks emerged to offer and inform accountability op-
tions across numerous jurisdictions.
87
These developments prompted Marco 
Sassòli’s observation that IHL had assumed new credibility and offered im-
proved effectiveness.
88
82. Gentian Zyberi, Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS, TRIBUNALS AND COURTS 377, 381–84 (Gerd Oberleitner, ed, 2018); 
see also Sharon Weill, Building Respect for IHL Through National Courts, 96 INT. REV. RED 
CROSS 859, 861 (2014).
83. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field art.49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter 
First Geneva Convention]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, 
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 129, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S.135 [here-
inafter Third Geneva Convention]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth 
Geneva Convention] (each containing common provisions that impose obligations to prose-
cute individuals that have committed war crimes).
84. Weill, supra note 82, at 861.
85. See Régis Bismuth, Mapping a Responsibility of Corporations for Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Sailing Between International and Domestic Legal Orders,
38 DENVER J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 203, 219 (2010).
86. See Rome Statute, supra note 35, arts. 1, 17; see also Ramiro García Falconí, The
Codification of Crimes Against Humanity in the Domestic Legislation of Latin American 
States, 10 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 453 (2010). See generally F. INT’L CRIM. AND 
HUMANITARIAN L., IMPORTING CORE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES INTO NATIONAL LAW
(Morten Bergsmo, Mads Harlem & Nobuo Hayshi eds., 2d ed. 2010).
87. See Sudan Peace Act, Pub. L. No. 107-245, §§ 6, 11, 116 Stat. 1504 (2002) (finding 
that the Sudanese Government would use the sale of oil to facilitate military action and direct-
ing the Secretary of State to collect information on violations of IHL); see also Burmese Free-
dom and Democracy Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-61, §§ 2–3, 117 Stat. 864 (2003) (ac-
knowledging violations of international law in Burma and forbidding all trade that would 
support the military regime); Kyle Rex Jacobson, Doing Business with the Devil: The Chal-
lenges of Prosecuting Corporate Officials Whose Business Transactions Facilitate War 
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 56 A.F. L. Rev. 167, 206–09 (2005).
88. Marco Sassòli, The Implementation of International Humanitarian Law: Current 
and Inherent Challenges, 10 Y.B INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 45, 46 (2007).
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The use of domestic mechanisms to impose IHL accountability for cor-
porate action builds upon pre-existing regulatory frameworks.
89
Accounta-
bility manifests through both criminal and civil pursuits, through both pure-
ly domestic mechanisms and with the use of universal jurisdiction. Criminal 
accountability, implemented directly, is grounded in the identical require-
ment, posed in each of the four Geneva Conventions, that obliges parties to 
enact legislation and provide penal sanctions for violations constituting 
grave breaches.
90
A 2006 survey of various domestic legal regimes conclud-
ed that incorporation initiatives often went beyond the limits of the interna-
tional legal architecture. Commonly, when imposing criminal liability, these 
jurisdictions did not distinguish between natural and legal persons.
91
A host of prosecutions followed. Many of these actions concern indi-
vidual actors—both state officials and members of non-state armed 
groups—that have been accused of IHL violations.
92
Yet, several notable 
instances demonstrate the willingness of domestic forums to impose ac-
countability for business actions occurring within armed conflict. In a cele-
brated 2007 decision, the Dutch Court of Appeal in The Hague increased 
the sentence of Frans van Anraat.
93
Van Anraat was the principal supplier of 
thiodiglycol to Iraq. After Saddam Hussein’s government used these sup-
plies to manufacture mustard gas, deployed in attacks against Iran and the 
Kurdish population in Halabja, van Anraat was convicted of complicity in 
89. See Albin Eser & Felix Rettenmaier, Criminality of Organizations: Lessons from 
Domestic Law – A Comparative Perspective, in SYSTEM CRIMINALITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 222, 222–223 (André Nollkaemper & Harmen van der Wilt eds., 2009). 
90. See First Geneva Convention, supra note 83, art. 49; Second Geneva Convention, 
supra note 83, art. 50; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 83, art. 129; Fourth Geneva 
Convention, supra note 83, art. 146.
91. See ANITA RAMASASTRY & ROBERT C. THOMPSON, COMMERCE, CRIME AND 
CONFLICT 15–16 (2006).
92. See Emina Dizdarevi , Bosnia Indicts Serb for Crimes Against Humanity in Kljuc,
DETEKTOR (Oct. 11, 2018), http://detektor.ba/en/bosnia-indicts-serb-for-crimes-against-
humanity-in-kljuc/ (describing the 2018 indictment of Zoran Adamovic by the Bosnian State 
Court); Benjamin Duerr, International Crimes: Spotlight on Germany’s War Crimes Unit,
PHILIPPE KIRSCH INSTITUTE (Jan. 10, 2019), http://www.kirschinstitute.ca/fr/international-
crimes-spotlight-germanys-war-crimes-unit/ (summarizing German trials against numerous 
individuals accused of various war crimes and IHL violations in Syria, Rwanda, and the 
DRC); DRC: Two Militiamen Found Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity, TRIAL INT’L (Sept. 
25, 2018), https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/drc-two-militiamen-found-guilty-of-crimes-
against-humanity/ (describing the first convictions by a military tribunal in the DRC against 
two former militia commanders that had been accused of crimes against humanity).
93. See Hof’s-Gravenhage 9 mei 2007, NJ 2007, BA4676, m.nt. M.C.Z. (Public Prose-
cutor/ Frans Cornelis Adrianus van Anraat) (Neth.) (for an English overview, see Public 
Prosecutor v. Frans Cornelis Adrianus van Anraat, INT’L CRIMES DATABASE,
http://www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Case/ 168/Van-Anraat/ (last visited Oct. 17, 
2020)).
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war crimes.
94
In 2018, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands upheld the 
conviction of Guus Kouwenhoven for aiding and abetting in the commission 
of war crimes.
95
Kouwenhoven, the head of Oriental Timber Corporation 
and the Royal Timber Company, had trafficked arms to Liberian dictator 
Charles Taylor in violation of Security Council sanctions.
96
A series of French cases further evidence the capacity of domestic legal 
bodies to impose accountability for corporate violations of IHL. In 2011, a 
Paris court began proceedings against Amesys, a French subsidiary of the 
Bull Group.
97
The technology company was accused of developing a sur-
veillance network that the Gaddafi regime in Libya used to identify, detain, 
and torture political dissidents.
98
Qosmos, a French software company, is 
under investigation for complicity in torture by the Al-Assad regime in Syr-
ia.
99
And in 2018, the French multinational, Lafarge was indicted for com-
plicity in crimes against humanity.
100
Significantly, the corporate entity itself 
was indicted.
101
This marked the first instance in which a legal person was 
implicated in the commission of a war crime.
102
Despite the increasing willingness of domestic courts to pursue criminal 
action against corporate actors, prosecutions remain rare. Leora Bilsky con-
vincingly argues that fixating on criminal remedies obscures the often more 
efficacious “specificities of civil litigation as a potential tool of corporate 
94. Id. (noting that Van Anraat was acquitted of the charge of genocide as the prosecu-
tion were unable to determine that he was aware of the Iraqi regime’s genocidal intent); see 
Salil Tripathi, Business in Armed Conflict Zones: How to Avoid Complicity and Comply with 
International Standards, 50 POLITIRBUS 131, 132–33 (2010).
95. HR 18 december 2018, NJ 2018, 1394, m.nt. H.J.S.K. (The Public Prosecutor/
Guus Kouwenhoven) (Neth.) (for an English overview, see http://www.internationalcrimes
database.org/Case/3309/The-Public-Prosecutor-v-Guus-Kouwenhoven/).
96. Id. See also, Batesmith, supra note 31, at 305.
97. See generally INT’L FED’N FOR HUM. RTS., THE AMESYS CASE (2015),
https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/report_amesys_case_eng.pdf.
98. Id.
99. See Qosmos, TRIAL INT’L (Sept. 12, 2019), https://trialinternational.org/latest-post
/qosmos/ (noting that new information was presented to the Court after the examining Magis-
trate decided to close the case and that the investigation is ongoing).
100. See France: Cement Company Lafarge Indicted by Investigative Judges over its 
Syria Activities, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RES. CTR. (June 28, 2018), https://www.business-
humanrights.org/en/france-cement-company-lafarge-indicted-by-investigative-judges-over-
its-syria-activities.
101. Alexandru Tofan, The Lafarge Affair: A First Step Towards Corporate Criminal 
Liability for Complicity in Crimes against Humanity, ASSER INST.: DOING BUS. RTS. BLOG
(Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.asser.nl/ DoingBusinessRight/Blog/post/the-lafarge-affair-a-first-
step-towards-corporate-criminal-liability-for-complicity-in-crimes-against-humanity-by-
alexandru-tofan.
102. See Liz Alderman, Terrorism Financing Charge Upheld Against French Company 
Lafarge, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/07/business/lafarge-
terrorism-syria.html.
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accountability.”
103
Civil avenues have long been available. An influential 
corporate complicity report by the International Commission of Jurists not-
ed that “in every jurisdiction, despite differences in terminology and ap-
proach, an actor can be held liable under the law of civil remedies if through 
negligent or intentional conduct it causes harm to someone else.”
104
The rel-
evant civil provisions extend domestic jurisdiction to corporate actors im-
plicated in violations of international humanitarian or criminal law.
105
The body of litigation produced under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) in 
the United States merits particular attention.
106
The ATS provides district 
courts with jurisdiction for “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or by a treaty of the United 
States.”
107
Importantly, relevant ATS cases meld IHL norms and ICL stand-
ards with domestic torts.
108
Cases have been brought against both individu-
als and corporate actors.
109
In Kadic v. Karadzic, the Court held that the 
ATS’s jurisdiction extends to claims of war crimes and other violations of 
international humanitarian law.
110
The scope of the ATS has, however, nar-
rowed considerably.
111
Despite curtailment of the ATS in the United States, other jurisdictions 
increasingly offer expanding avenues to pursue redress.
112
The International 
Commission of Jurists has noted that civil accountability can “significantly 
influence patterns of behaviour in a society, raising expectations as to what 
is acceptable conduct, and preventing repeat of particular conduct, by both 
the actor held liable, and by other actors who operate in similar 
103. LEORA BILSKY, THE HOLOCAUST, CORPORATIONS, AND THE LAW 33 (2017).
104. 3 INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, CORPORATE COMPLICITY & LEGAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 10 (2008) [hereinafter ICJ, CORPORATE COMPLICITY REPORT].
105. See RAMASASTRY & THOMPSON, supra note 91, at 22–25.
106. See generally BETH STEPHENS, JUDITH CHOMSKY, JENNIFER GREEN, PAUL 
HOFFMAN & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S.
COURTS (2nd ed. 2008).
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714–15, 
729 (2004); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980).
108. See Bismuth, supra note 85, at 225.
109. See Harmen van der Wilt, Corporate Criminal Responsibility for International 
Crimes: Exploring the Possibilities, 12 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 43, 49 (2013); Doe I v. Unocal 
Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 2002); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 
Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
110. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241–44 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Bismuth, supra
note 85, at 222–24.
111. See infra Section III.C.
112. Jodie A. Kirshner, Why is the U.S. Abdicating the Policing of Multinational Corpo-
rations to Europe?: Extraterritoriality, Sovereignty, and the Alien Tort Statute, 30 BERKELEY 
J. INT’L L. 259, 279–281 (2012) (detailing developments in the use of civil litigation within 
the United Kingdom, South Africa, and Europe); see Nevsun Resources Ltd. v. Araya, [2020] 
5 S.C.R. (Can) (indicating willingness to hear civil cases alleging that corporations had violat-
ed norms of customary international law in their overseas operations).
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spheres. . .”
113
Accountability for corporate violations has undoubtedly ad-
vanced over the past decades. Yet practice demonstrates that limitations 
shroud each of the ancillary methods used to extend accountability to corpo-
rations whose business activities occur within conflict zones. Both structural 
and implementation challenges affect each of the discussed doctrinal ap-
proaches. Collectively, these contribute to accountability gaps. The follow-
ing section discusses how structural factors complicate the transference of 
these legal frameworks to corporations and how the resulting regulatory ad-
vancements are complicated by various features of the corporate form.
III. Identifying Accountability Gaps
Structural and operational factors inhibit the regulatory efforts that ex-
tend to corporate entities operating within conflict zones. The legal frame-
works, described above, have developed through analogies. The corporation 
is likened to, and regulated through, the state.
114
The legal mechanisms, a 
series of primary and secondary rules, concepts, and norms that are tradi-
tionally intended to limit and regulate the ways in which militaries use 
force, are applied to business entities. However, the transference of existing 
mechanisms, initially designed through a statist gaze, do not neatly map on-
to the corporate form. Failures to appreciate the specificities of the corpora-
tion result in regulatory frameworks that are structurally ill-equipped to ad-
dress various manifestations of business operations that implicate IHL.
Aspects of these challenges are familiar. They consist of overarching 
implementation and enforcement deficits with which the international law-
yer is well-acquainted. Such features do not extend exclusively to IHL. IHL 
does, however, experience particular challenges that differentiate it from 
those other fields of international law that regulate corporate conduct. Two 
factors motivate this article’s narrow scope. The first is urgency. The sali-
ence of the identified accountability gaps is increased in relation to IHL. As 
corporations become prominent international actors imbued with state-like 
characteristics—what Jay Butler has recently termed semi-states—the 
state’s traditional monopolization of the use of force is likely to erode fur-
ther as the involvement of corporations in conflict increases.
115
The second challenge stems from IHL’s dependence upon domestic 
mechanisms. The absence of a universal judicial system means that many 
areas of international law are reliant upon domestic implementation, moni-
toring, and enforcement. Such reliance is heightened with IHL when en-
forcement lags and permanent international courts hear only a select few 
113. ICJ, CORPORATE COMPLICITY REPORT, supra note 104, at 4.
114. Ronald C. Slye, Corporations, Veils, and International Criminal Liability, 33 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 955, 961 (2008) (noting that both corporations and states unite individuals 
for common purpose and both possess the capacity for good or ill).
115. See generally Jay Butler, Corporations as Semi-States, 57 COLUM. J. OF 
TRANSNAT’L L. 221 (2019).
Fall 2020] Differentiating the Corporation 67
cases.
116
Efforts to ensure IHL accountability through domestic means are 
pursued directly or indirectly through a civilian court or the military justice 
system. In such instances a judicial body will decide whether an individual’s
actions violate IHL. They will consider whether a policy is compliant with 
the state’s international obligations. And they will interpret the content and 
specificity of these obligations.
117
In each instance, the domestic interaction 
presupposes some relation to the state. It fails to consider the specificities of 
the corporation and how these will affect the pursuit of accountability.
Often these specificities reflect the nature of the corporation itself. Cor-
porations assume a diversity of structures.
118
Despite variants, five features 
are common amongst all corporations. The corporate form is constructed 
around: (i) legal personality; (ii) limited liability; (iii) transferable shares; 
(iv) centralized management and a board structure; and (v) shared owner-
ship.
119
All jurisdictions contain legislation that provides for the formation 
of organizations that exhibit these characteristics.
120
Yet as many commenta-
tors note, the corporation is not merely a legal entity. It is a significant inter-
national actor that regularly influences economic, political, and social pro-
ceedings.
121
This public-private dichotomy undergirds both calls for 
corporate regulation and the creation of regulatory challenges.
122
It is here, however, that a state-derived approach impresses upon efforts 
to check corporate conduct.
123
Because the corporate entity possesses analo-
gous powers, subsequent efforts to impose accountability recall those simi-
lar techniques, doctrines, and instruments whose erstwhile application is 
limited to, or derived from, the state.
124
The corporation is, as Fleur Johns 
describes, rendered state-like to neatly impose international law-based re-
straints.
125
But when regulatory efforts result in the coupling of familiar 
structural limitations and under-appreciated features of the corporate form, 
116. See Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, Joint Blog Series: Application of International Hu-
manitarian Law by Domestic Courts, EJIL TALK! (Sept. 15, 2015), https://www.ejiltalk.org
/application-of-international-humanitarian-law-by-domestic-courts.
117. Id; see also Zyberi, supra note 82, at 383.
118. Julian G. Ku, The Limits of Corporate Rights Under International Law, 12 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 729, 753 (2012).
119. See John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate Law? 
in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 1, 5 (Reinier Kraakman, et al., 2017); see also ALICE 
DE JONGE, CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2013).
120. See Armour, supra note 119, at 5.
121. See Id. at 22–25; see also Ratner, supra note 2, at 452–59.
122. See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 39 DUKE L. J. 201, 201–02 (1990); 
see also Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT. L.J. 229, 235.
123. See Fleur Johns, Theorizing the Corporation in International Law, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 635, 641–42 (Anne Orford and Florian 
Hoffmann eds., 2016).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 643.
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these processes contribute to the generation of accountability gaps that facil-
itate the corporation’s ability to operate beyond the reach of the imposed le-
gal frameworks.
A. The Limited Scope of International Criminal Law
International criminal law can provide an effective means of imposing 
accountability for the most egregious corporate violations of IHL. Yet de-
spite notable successes, ICL’s scope remains limited. The U.S. Military Tri-
bunal at Nuremberg sought accountability for corporate violations.
126
The 
German industrialists were accused of dire acts. They had enabled the forci-
ble transfer and enslavement of whole populations, aided in the procurement 
of weapons brandished to wage aggressive war, and supplied the chemicals 
and poisons deployed in the concentration camps.
127
Prosecutions have, 
since these formative trials, focused (though with important and foretelling 
exceptions) on natural not legal persons. Accountability is, however, limited 
by two factors. First, these post-Nuremberg developments limit judicial 
reach to all but the most egregious violators. And second, efforts to impose 
corporate accountability through the extension of a complicity standard that 
draws upon international jurisprudence, domestic legal prescriptions, and a 
series of mechanisms designed to address state conduct are restricted by 
particular features of the corporate form.
Transfixed by the most serious core crimes, Article 5 of the Rome Stat-
ute focuses the Court’s jurisdiction on instances of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and aggression.
128
Similarly, the inclusion of grave 
breaches within the Geneva Conventions directs attention towards those 
violations that are of particular seriousness and which require the High Con-
tracting Parties to prosecute offending entities.
129
Compelling policy reasons 
support these narrow approaches.
130
Several scholars, however, demonstrate 
that the designation of core crimes is largely artificial.
131
Various forms of 
126. See generally Matthew Lippman, War Crimes Trials of German Industrialists: The 
‘Other Schindlers’, 9 TEMP. INT’L. & COMP. L.J. 173 (1995).
127. See United States v. Krauch, Judgment, 8 T.W.C. 1081, 1136 (1948); See also
United States v. Flick (The Flick Case), 6 T.W.C. 1202 (1997); United States v. Krupp (The 
Krupp Case), 9 T.W.C 1 (1997).
128. Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 5 (noting that the ICC’s jurisdiction is limited to 
“the most serious crimes of concern to the international community”).
129. See First Geneva Convention, supra note 83, art. 50; see also Second Geneva Con-
vention, supra note 83, art. 51; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 83, art. 130; Fourth Ge-
neva Convention, supra note 83, art. 147.
130. See ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation (Sept. 15, 2016), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/ 20160915_OTP-PolicyCase-SelectionEng.pdf.
131. See Christine Schwöbel-Patel, The Core Crimes of International Criminal Law, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 768 (Kevin Jon Heller, et al. 
eds., forthcoming); see also Margaret M. deGuzman, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the Inter-
national Criminal Court, 32 FORDHAM. INT’L L.J. 1400 (2009). 
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corporate behavior that do not constitute core crimes or amount to grave 
breaches but nevertheless implicate IHL remain under-conceptualized by 
the existing ICL mechanisms.
Accountability gaps form in the space between the commission of a 
core crime and the familiar conduct of a modern corporation. John Ruggie 
tells that “few legitimate firms may ever directly commit acts that amount to 
international crimes. . .[T]here is a greater risk of their facing allegations of 
complicity in such crimes.”
132
Criminal tribunals have prosecuted corporate 
actors as accomplices in the commission of war crimes.
133
ICL deems such 
faciliatory acts as aiding and abetting.
134
Yet it is but for the rare or egre-
gious instances that corporate complicity receives prosecutorial attention.
135
And international law has not yet provided a coherent doctrine of complicity 
that can be seamlessly applied amongst its many sub-fields.
136
In Khulumani v. Barclays, Judge Katzmann described complicity as the 
preferred doctrinal means of ensuring that “private actors who substantially 
assist state actors [to] violate international law and do so for the purpose of 
facilitating the unlawful activity [are] held accountable for their actions.”
137
The requisite complicity standard is adapted from legal sources that either 
treat state conduct or inadequately acknowledge the particularities of corpo-
rate actors.
138
132. U.N. Human Rights Council, Business and Human Rights: Mapping International 
Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4
/035 (Feb. 9, 2007) [hereinafter HRC, Standards of Responsibility].
133. See, e.g., United Kingdom v. Tesch (The Zyklon B Case), Case No. 9, 1 
L.R.T.W.C. 93 (1946); see also Schabas, supra note 11, at 442.
134. See Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement, ¶ 195 (May 21, 
1999) (defining aiding as giving assistance to someone while abetting involves facilitating the 
commission of an act by being sympathetic thereto). See also Schabas, supra note 11, at 442.
135. See ICC-OTP, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor, at 
6–7 (2003), https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/1fa7c4c6-de5f-42b7-8b25-60aa962ed8b6
/143594/030905_policy_paper.pdf (declaring that the OPT should focus resources on those 
who bear the greatest responsibility). For exceptions see ICC Press Release, supra note 36
(regarding the examination of atrocity crimes in the DRC); see also Luis Moreno-Ocampo, 
Prosecutor, ICC, Report at the Second Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Sept. 8, 2003) (acknowledging the influence of mineral extrac-
tion on the conflict in the Ituri Province and expressing willingness to investigate private ac-
tors facilitating the conflict); Kaeb, supra note 35, at 375.
136. See Butler, supra note 115, at 278–89.
137. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 281 (2d Cir. 2007).
138. See John G. Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue 
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises), Promotion 
and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Including The Right To Development: Clarifying the Concepts of Sphere of Influence and 
Complicity, ¶¶ 33–48, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/16 (May 15, 2008) [hereinafter UNHRC, Clarify-
ing the Concepts]; DE JONGE, supra note 119, at 152, 155 (extending the Draft Articles to 
transnational corporations); see also Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 16, in Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Ses-
sion, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (holding that a state can be deemed responsible for aiding and 
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William Schabas distills the three elements necessary to establish the 
international criminal complicity of secondary actors.
139
Accountability for 
corporate behavior implicating IHL first requires that an atrocity crime has 
been committed by another actor.
140
In Prosecutor v. Jelesic, the ICTY held 
that considerations of whether the defendant aided and abetted the commis-
sion of genocide obliges the Trial Chamber to deduce if the constituting ac-
tion occurred.
141
The second element requires that the corporate actor has 
committed a material act that contributes to the perpetration of a crime. The 
contours of this requirement, Schabas notes, are unsettled.
142
Proponents of a low threshold have advocated that even marginal acts 
of assistance constitute complicity.
143
More influential direction, however, 
comes from the ICTY. Imposing a stringent standard, in Prosecutor v. Tad-
ic, the Trial Chamber held that an act of complicity must be “direct and sub-
stantial.”
144
This follows the standard assumed by the International Law 
Commission.
145
In its Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and the Secu-
rity of Mankind, the ILC instructs that individual criminal responsibility ex-
tends to an actor that “knowingly aids, abets or otherwise assists, directly 
and substantially, in the commission of such a crime. . .”
146
The complicit 
act, to satisfy the third element, must exhibit the intent and knowledge of 
the legal or natural person that facilitates the underlying action.
147
The ICTY 
requires that a complicit actor must knowingly decide to participate in the 
“planning, instigating, ordering, committing, or otherwise aiding and abet-
ting in the commission of a crime.”
148
abetting in the commission of an international wrongful act by another state) [hereinafter 
ARSIWA].
139. See Schabas, supra note 11, at 446–49; See also Oona A. Hathaway, et al., Aiding 
and Abetting in International Criminal Law, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1593, 1613–17 (2019).
140. See Schabas, supra note 11, at 447.
141. Prosecutor v. Jelesic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Trial Judgement, ¶ 87 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14, 1999); see Prosecutor v. Akayseu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-
T, Judgement, ¶ 530 (Sept. 2, 1998) (establishing that complicity is not contingent on demon-
strating the guilt of the principal actor); see also Schabas, supra note 11, at 447.
142. See Schabas, supra note 11, at 447.
143. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 671 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997) (seeking to impose liability for participation in 
a crime that would include contributing “in any manner whatsoever regardless of one’s specif-
ic role in the commission of the offending act”).
144. Id. ¶ 691; see also Schabas, supra note 11, at 447.
145. See also Schabas, supra note 11, at 447
146. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 
Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/51/10, at 18 (1996) [hereinafter ILC, Crimes Against 
Peace and Security].
147. Schabas, supra note 11, at 448.
148. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 674 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997).
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Both states and corporations act through individuals. Mechanisms like 
the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts (“ARSIWA”) determine when individual conduct is attributable to the 
state.
149
Parallels between the state and the corporation are useful points of 
departure but are ultimately incomplete.
150
Early appeals to ICL were, and 
albeit to a lesser extent remain, limited by the principle societas delinquere 
non potest.151 Assessments of accountability can target either the individual 
representative or the corporate entity. Traditionally, and most commonly, 
assessments begin by identifying relevant individuals before determining 
whether the private actor is subject to criminal sanctions for actions impli-
cating international law. These efforts to ensure accountability are, however, 
limited by features of the corporate form.
Delegated management, under a board structure, is required to ensure 
the efficient operation of an entity whose ownership is constantly chang-
ing.
152
The corporate form provides governance structures that delegate de-
cision-making between a board of directors and operational managers. This 
imposes a legal separation between common business decisions and the rati-
fication of these decisions.
153
Intended to check the value of the firm’s busi-
ness conduct, such delegation complicates assessments of whether a corpo-
rate official knowingly made a direct and substantial contribution to the 
commission of a core crime. Corporate law imposes liability for wrongful 
acts committed by individuals operating in their formal capacity.
154
The cor-
porate veil is firm but not impenetrable.
155
However, assessments of individ-
ual responsibility may elude accountability through the nature of collective 
decision-making. A corporate harm, an unquestioned set of facts, may occur 
but attribution is avoided if an individual, possessing the requisite actus reus
and mens rea, is not identified.156 Complex management structures, the role 
and operations of subsidiaries, and the bifurcated nature of decision-making
between the board and management create degrees of separation.
Drawing upon organizational theory, Meir Dan-Cohen identifies dis-
continuity between individual and collective preferences. Dan-Cohen de-
scribes how a corporate action—for present purposes, one that facilitates 
commission of a core crime—is the product of “widely dispersed informa-
149. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON 
STATE RESPONSIBILITY 91–92 (2002).
150. See DE JONGE, supra note 119, at 78–79.
151. See generally Thomas Weigend, Societas Delinquere non Potest? A German Per-
spective, 6 J. INT’L. CRIM. JUST. 927 (2008).
152. Armour, supra note 119, at 11–12.
153. Id. at 12.
154. See generally CELIA WELLS, CORPORATIONS AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY (2d 
ed. 2001).
155. See generally John H. Matheson, Why Courts Pierce: An Empirical Study of Pierc-
ing the Corporate Veil, 7 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1 (2010).
156. Slye, supra note 114, at 962.
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tional sources and diffused individual interests and attitudes, all mediated by 
structures, processes, and chance in ways that defy translating or tracing the 
organizational decision into its individual sources.”
157
Accountability gaps 
occur when assessment of the corporate official’s involvement is derailed by 
an inability to disentangle the individual’s contribution from the organiza-
tional nature of the corporation’s decision-making structure.
In the rare (or future) instance when international criminal liability is 
pursued against a corporate entity, similar challenges are accentuated.
158
The 
various ICL tribunals offer differing evidentiary accounts of the mens rea
requirement.
159
Article 30 of the Rome Statute holds that criminal liability is 
contingent upon both knowledge and intent.
160
This creates a threshold, 
complicated by the corporate form, that may become unattainable when ap-
plied to complicit conduct.
161
Satisfaction of this standard will, again, re-
quire that individual impetuses are parsed from collective structures.
162
De-
scribing the paradoxical task of assessing corporate mens rea, Vikramaditya 
Khanna tells of how corporate structures may partition information, separat-
ing those that act from those that possess the requisite information about the 
act’s implications.
163
International legal developments that limit their remit 
to only the most egregious acts—that inadequately conceptualize either the 
contributory nature of corporate behavior or the particular features of the 
corporate form—curtail the instances in which accountability for corporate 
conduct implicating IHL may be pursued.
157. MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 34 (1986).
158. See Nadia Bernaz, Corporate Criminal Liability Under International Law: The 
New TV S.A.L. and Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. Cases at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 13 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 313, 320 (noting the rarity of corporate liability in international tribunals); 
See also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d. Cir. 2010) (remarking that 
international law has never extended the scope of liability to corporations).
159. See Michael J. Kelley, Prosecuting Corporations for Genocide Under International 
Law, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 339, 360 (2012).
160. Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 30 (basing intent on meaningful engagement and 
the purposeful cause of a consequence and holding that knowledge means awareness of a cir-
cumstance or the occurrence of a consequence).
161. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 
322 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (extending a purpose and knowledge-based standard to a corporate actor 
accused of violating international law); see also Roger Alford, Second Circuit Adopts Purpose 
Test for ATS Corporate Liability, OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 2, 2009), http://opiniojuris.org/2009/10
/02/second-circuit-adoptspurpose-test-for-ats-corporate-liability/; Kelley, supra note 159, at 
354 (both demonstrating the difficulty of satisfying this standard in relations to corporate 
complicity).
162. V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault a Faulty Notion?: The Case of Cor-
porate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REV. 355, 369–370 (detailing how a single actor standard, com-
mon in domestic legal systems, applies respondeat superior to attribute the actions and mens 
rea of an offending agent to the corporate entity).
163. Id. at 380–81.
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B. The Narrow Ambit of International Human Rights Law
Such a narrow scope is not limited to ICL. International human rights 
law provides the most comprehensive international legal framework dedi-
cated to the regulation of business entities. This framework acknowledges 
the particular challenges posed by conflict to human rights. Yet the devel-
opment of the UNGP and other IHRL-based initiatives afford IHL auxiliary 
status within the dedicated mechanisms. The primary rules contained within 
the human rights framework fail to adequately conceptualize common mani-
festations of corporate conduct within conflict zones and remain vulnerable 
to features of the corporate form. First, accountability is eluded within spac-
es where the regulatory reach and primary rules imposed through IHRL fail 
to recognize or treat the particular IHL implications of corporate conduct. 
Avoidance is furthered by an under-articulated conception of complicity 
that neglects conduct implicating IHL. And second, the principles of limited 
liability and corporate separation have been extended to insulate corpora-
tions from accountability. These features of the corporate form compromise 
the development and efficacy of regulatory frameworks.
164
Human rights law is often presented as the most effective means of ad-
vancing corporate responsibility. Preferred to criminal or civil pursuits, Mi-
chael Addo suggests that the pervasiveness of human rights law, its treat-
ment of, and applicability to, an array of corporate activities, positions 
IHRL as an efficacious means of advancing collective objectives.
165
Howev-
er, the UNGP make limited reference to IHL.
166
Its follow-up reports pro-
vide minimal elucidation about the content or applicability of specific IHL 
norms and how these influence business operations within conflict areas.
167
Many of the prominent civil society initiatives that consider the perils of 
conducting business within high-risk environments offer prescriptions found 
only in IHRL.
168
This narrow scope creates broad spaces in which forms of 
164. See Peter T. Muchlinski, Corporations in International Law, ¶ 4, in MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2014).
165. Michael K. Addo, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations—An Introduc-
tion, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS 3, 23–24 (Michael K. Addo ed., 1999).
166. See U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 76, princs. 7, 12.
167. See Special Representative Report 2011, supra note 81; see also John G. Ruggie 
(Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transna-
tional Corporations and Other Business Enterprises), Business and Human Rights in Conflict
Affected Regions: The Roles of States (2009), https://media.business-humanrights.org/media
/documents/files/reports-and-materials/Ruggie-conflict-project-note-Oct-2009.pdf [hereinafter 
Special Representative Report 2009].
168. See, e.g., YADAIRA ORSINI & ROPER CLELAND, HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE 
IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED SETTINGS 11 (International Alert 2018) (acknowledging the occur-
rence of IHL violations in conflict affected areas and stating in a footnote that “whether 
[these] conditions trigger specific and different considerations under [IHL] is an important but 
separate consideration that requires targeted legal and expert advice); see also Shift, supra
note 80, at 2.
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corporate conduct escape the regulatory attention of IHRL-based frame-
works. The Special Representative’s report on Business and Human Rights 
in Conflict-Affected Areas does not directly reference IHL.
169
Instead, the 
report encourages states to warn businesses that armed conflict raises the 
likelihood of human rights abuses and to convey their expectations, through 
legislation and regulation, regarding business conduct within such environ-
ments.
170
Inclusion of IHL is often limited to a reference. Its relevancy is noted 
but rarely articulated. Collectively, the various instruments say little about 
how IHL and IHRL norms interact. Do these interactions affect business 
operations within conflict zones? Potential norm conflicts, frequent occur-
rences documented within the well-trodden debates regarding the parallel 
application of these legal fields, go unremarked.
171
This consideration is par-
ticularly pertinent within situations of occupation. Numerous courts and 
treaty bodies have acknowledged IHRL and IHL’s dual application upon the 
imposition of foreign control.
172
The ICJ has recognized that within an oc-
cupation, instances occur in which particular rights are exclusively matters 
of IHL, other rights will be the exclusive matter of IHRL, and others will be 
relevant to both fields of law.
173
Accountability gaps occur when business 
conduct, ostensibly compliant with the requirements imposed through hu-
man rights law, infringes upon IHL-based norms that are undertheorized by 
the prominent IHRL-based frameworks.
174
Such conduct is often indirect. IHRL offers a broad conception of com-
plicity.
175
As this is, however, derived from ICL and domestic law, it shares 
similar limitations to those identified above.
176
The UNGP determines that 
complicity arises when a “business enterprise contributes to, or is seen as 
169. Special Representative Report 2009, supra note 167.
170. Id. at 1.
171. See e.g., Marko Milanovic, Norm Conflicts, International Humanitarian Law, and 
Human Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW 95 (Orna Ben-Naftali ed., 2011) (providing an overview of the relationship be-
tween IHL and IHRL).
172. See Cordula Droege, Elective Affinities? Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 90 
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 501 (2008) (providing a comprehensive review of the dual application 
of IHRL and IHL in situations of armed conflict).
173. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Ter-
ritory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 106 July 9)).
174. See discussion infra Section IV.C.
175. See John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises), Clarifying 
the Concepts of Sphere of Influence and Complicity,” ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/16 (May 15, 
2008) [hereinafter HRC Clarifying Complicity].
176. Id. ¶¶ 28, 33 (noting the origins of the complicity standard); see also DE JONGE,
supra note 119, at 79 (describing the challenges of imposing a complicity standard on corpo-
rate actors through a human rights framework).
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contributing to, adverse human rights impacts caused by other parties.”
177
Complicity is linked to the due diligence process and the corporate respon-
sibility to respect human rights includes avoiding complicity.
178
The UNGP 
does, however, move beyond ICL to recognize a parallel, non-legal, concep-
tion of complicity.
179
The Global Compact further elucidates an IHRL-based 
complicity standard. Principle Two explains that businesses should ensure 
that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.
180
It acknowledges that 
complicity may be direct, beneficial, or silent.181
Despite these references, an IHRL-derived notion of complicity remains 
undefined. John Ruggie notes that several conceptions of complicity—
designations that describe common forms of corporate conduct—are more 
likely to be the source of social opprobrium than the cause of legal liabil-
ity.
182
Ruggie’s clarification report holds that “given the variations in defini-
tions of complicity within different legal contexts, it is not possible to speci-
fy exacting tests for what constitutes complicity even within the legal 
sphere.”
183
Considerations of international humanitarian law are largely ne-
glected by resulting IHRL complicity assessments.
184
During this process, a 
corporate actor may perform comprehensive due diligence to consider 
whether its operations indirectly affect the human rights of others but fail to 
consider how that same conduct influences specific IHL-based norms.
Such a scenario envisions a corporate official that operates in good faith 
but is not structurally enticed to perform a more robust evaluation. The less 
inclined actor may, however, purposefully appeal to features of the corpo-
rate form to blunt international law’s regulatory reach. The principle of lim-
ited liability serves as a contracting tool to tie a creditor’s claims to assets 
that are owned by the firm. Limited liability protects shareholders by cap-
ping their risk at, in most instances, the amount of their financial outlay.
185
The principle, initially designed, protects against contractual claims so as to 
facilitate diversification and passive investment.
186
This allows risk-averse 
177. See U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 76, at 18.
178. Id.; see also HRC Clarifying Complicity, supra note 175, ¶¶ 4, 26.
179. U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 76, at 18; see also HRC Clarifying Complicity,
supra note 175, ¶ 27.
180. U.N. Global Compact, supra note 67, princ. 2.
181. Id, at commentary to princ. 2.
182. See HRC Clarifying Complicity, supra note 175,  ¶ 70; see also DE JONGE, supra
note 119, at 155.
183. HRC Clarifying Complicity, supra note 175,  ¶ 33.
184. But see ARSIWA, supra note 138, art. 16 (which provides a more robust account of 
aiding and assisting).
185. Armour et. al., supra note 119, at 9.
186. Id. (noting that the compelling reasons for limited liability do not necessarily ex-
tend beyond the contractual context).
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investors to provide capital to uncertain ventures.
187
Yet as early as the 
eighteenth century, economists expressed skepticism.
188
Adam Smith 
claimed that limiting liability would diminish responsibility.
189
The limited 
liability principle developed, as it was applied to corporate investors, to en-
courage what Marie-Laure Djelic and Joel Bothello term “de-
responsibilization.”
190
This contributes to the desirability and construction of 
business environments in which risk-taking is maximized and obligation is 
reduced.
191
Such environments adversely affect how international legal initiatives 
develop and how accountability mechanisms are implemented. Expansion 
of the limited liability principle to insulate parent companies demonstrates 
how prioritization of asset protection compromises accountability.
192
Parent 
companies are rarely deemed accountable for the actions of subsidiaries.
193
The corporate veil may be pierced if the parent directly controls and uses 
the subsidiary to perform a wrongful act.
194
This, however, is difficult to 
demonstrate.
195
In many jurisdictions, the presumption remains that the par-
ent does not incur tortious liability for the acts of subsidiaries in all but the 
rarest instances.
196
Subsidiaries, used strategically, become ephemeral. They can be formed 
to undertake a singular transaction and distant the parent’s business interest 
from legal consequences or negative connotations.
197
By externalizing risk, 
through subsidiaries and corporate separation, accountability is dimin-
187. See Marie-Laure Djelic & Joel Bothello, Limited Liability and Its Moral Hazard 
Implications: The Systemic Inscription of Instability in Contemporary Capital, 42 THEORY &
SOC’Y 589, 606–07 (2013).
188. Id, at 602–03.
189. Id.; see generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF 
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, Book V, Ch. 1 (1999).
190. Djelic & Bothello, supra note 187, at 607.
191. See Kirshner, supra note 112, at 264–65 (detailing how features of limited liability 
can be used to shield parent corporations from liability incurred by subsidiaries).
192. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61–64 (holding that liability protection 
extends to the parents of subsidiaries). See generally Gwynne Skinner, Rethinking Limited 
Liability of Parent Corporations for Foreign Subsidiaries’ Violations of International Human 
Rights Law, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1769, 1772–73 (2015) (tracing this expansion to when 
states began allowing corporations to own the shares of other corporations in the 1880s).
193. But see Kiarie Mwaura, Internalization of Costs to Corporate Groups: Part-Whole 
Relationships, Human Rights Norms and the Futility of the Corporate Veil, 11 J. INT’L BUS. &
L. 85, 102–05 (describing the use of enterprise principles to ensure more encompassing regu-
latory efforts).
194. Skinner, supra note 192, at 1773.
195. Mwaura, supra note 193, at 101–02 (noting the absence of statutory rules that detail 
when and under what conditions the corporate veil may be pierced).
196. Skinner, supra note 192, at 1774; see also IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica Life 
Ins., 136 F.3d 537, 540 (7th Cir. 1998).
197. See Butler, supra note 115, at 278–79.
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ished.
198
Harmful conduct implicating IHL is compartmentalized. A parent 
company can benefit enormously through the subsidiaries’ undertakings. 
With effective corporate structuring, the parent maintains the profitable or 
otherwise advantageous features of the relationship but through the corpo-
rate form achieves reputational distance and reduced liability. Norms de-
rived from IHL are twice neglected. They are minimized within the IHRL 
mechanisms that are most prominently applied to corporations and they are 
prone to circumvention by the strategically inclined actor that insulates itself 
from the accountability initiatives that are intended to curtail the harmful 
effects of businesses that operate within conflict zones.
C. The Varying Nature of Domestic Law and Courts
Accountability initiatives are often pursued within domestic venues.
199
Due to meager enforcement prospects and through purposeful design, many 
fields of international law rely upon domestic institutions to implement pri-
mary legal rules and provide remedies following violations.
200
As alluded to 
above, IHL is particularly reliant upon domestic mechanisms. Whether 
treated through international criminal law or under the auspices of the rele-
vant human rights mechanisms, domestic implementation assumes a cumu-
lative role in ensuring accountability. Efforts to regulate corporate conduct 
have developed accordingly and also rely upon such indirect methods.
201
The Geneva Conventions prescribe that violations of IHL—by a state, an 
armed group, and as extended to corporate actors—compel domestic re-
dress.
202
International criminal institutions are positioned as complementary 
to national jurisdictions.
203
And the UNGP is premised upon the protect, re-
spect, and remedy framework.
204
Having precluded a binding corporate duty 
to respect individual rights, accountability initiatives made through the 
UNGP become contingent on domestic capabilities.
205
198. See Kirshner, supra note 112, at 264–65.
199. See Weill, supra note 82, at 860 (noting the importance of domestic courts in the 
enforcement of international law).
200. See UDHR, supra note 53, art. 8 (noting that everyone has the right to a remedy by 
a competent national tribunal); see also ICCPR, supra note 55, art. 2(3) (ensuring that every-
one whose rights are violated will have access to a remedy); David Bilchitz, Corporations and 
the Limits of State-Based Models for Protecting Fundamental Rights in International Law, 23 
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 143, 156 (2016) (detailing how the right to a remedy is contin-
gent on the strength of the domestic sphere).
201. See generally Carlos M. Vázquez, Direct Vs. Indirect Obligations of Corporations 
Under International Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 927 (2005).
202. See Weill, supra note 82, at 861. See generally ANDRÉ NOLLKAEMPER, NATIONAL 
COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW (2011).
203. Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 1.
204. U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 76, at 1.
205. U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Im-
plementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework, 14, U.N. Doc A
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Such capabilities are, however, variable. Impressive gains have been 
made throughout the post-Rome era.
206
But jurisdictional and structural re-
strictions create instances in which accountability for corporate behavior 
implicating IHL is limited. Gaps result from alterations within particular le-
gal systems, divergences amongst various legal systems, and the tendency 
of courts to preference IHRL-based considerations. Furthermore, particular 
characteristics, explicit to the corporate form, may be employed to position 
a firm beyond the reach of domestically-imposed accountability initiatives.
The once comprehensive reach of the ATS has, as noted, been nar-
rowed. Earlier U.S. jurisprudence, culminating in Doe v. Unocal Corp., ex-
panded the ATS’s remit to include human rights and IHL violations by cor-
porations and their executives.
207
A series of cases under the ATS 
demonstrated how domestic courts could bolster enforcement of human 
rights norms and ensure accountability for harmful corporate conduct.
208
But 
in what is now a familiar story, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, the Su-
preme Court limited the Act’s extraterritorial application.
209
Uncertainty fol-
lowed. Then, in Jesner v. Arab Bank, the Supreme Court ruled that foreign 
plaintiffs were unable to bring claims against foreign corporations under the 
ATS.
210
Jurisprudential shifts curtail opportunities to pursue redress through 
domestic courts. The varying and then limited scope of domestic measures 
further contributes to existing accountability gaps within which forms of 
corporate behavior successfully circumvent the attention of domestic courts.
Similarly, the ability to pursue accountability through domestic venues 
is jurisdictionally dependent. Although the International Commission of Ju-
rists has documented the near universal availability of civil remedies, the 
ability to initiate action against corporate actors accused of violating inter-
national law ranges.
211
Several jurisdictions took strategic guidance from the 
success of the pre-Kiobel ATS litigation. Lawyers outside of the United 
States followed course, availing themselves of civil remedies in pursuit of 
accountability for gross violations of international law by corporate ac-
/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (stating that the responsibility of business enterprises to respect 
human rights is distinct from issues of legal liability and enforcement, which remain defined 
largely by national law provisions in relevant jurisdictions); see also Bilchitz, supra note 200,
at 156 (noting that since corporations have no direct legal obligations towards individuals, no 
legal remedy can be claimed against them unless the state has created obligations for corpora-
tions).
206. See Weill, supra note 82, at 873. See generally Valerie Oosterveld, Mike Perry & 
John McManus, The Cooperation of States with the International Criminal Court, 25 
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 767 (2001).
207. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir, 2002)
208. See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, The Alien Tort Statute, Civil Society, and Corpo-
rate Responsibility, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 971 (2004).
209. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 114–25 (2013).
210. Jesner v. Arab Bank Plc., 138 S. Ct. 1368 (2018).
211. See generally ICJ, CORPORATE COMPLICITY REPORT, supra note 104.
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tors.
212
These initiatives, however, remain limited. Several additional factors 
bar individuals from successfully initiating domestic legal actions. The In-
ternational Commission of Jurists notes the impediments created by power 
imbalances between corporations and individuals, the lack of legal aid, cost 
burdens, and low compensation, the restrictions posed by statutes of limita-
tions, and the principle of forum non conveniens.213 Collectively, such fac-
tors bar access and result in further accountability gaps in which numerous 
forms of corporate conduct go untreated.
214
When accusations do reach a judicial body, domestic courts often limit 
the scope of their engagements with international humanitarian law. While 
this varies by jurisdiction, many national courts accentuate actions involving 
their own nationals and remain reluctant to review decisions concerning the 
use of force or which have security implications.
215
When actions are 
brought, courts commonly preference human rights-based considerations. 
Often, this is to the exclusion of IHL. Sharon Weill notes that courts “in-
creasingly tend to apply international human rights law during armed con-
flicts.”
216
Courts may lack the necessary expertise to comprehensively en-
gage with norms derived from IHL.
217
This poses similar challenges to those 
identified above. Interactions between IHRL and IHL receive minimal con-
sideration and an exclusive human rights-based approach risks underappre-
ciating particular forms of corporate conduct that compromise IHL norms.
It is here too—within the domestic sphere where accountability initia-
tives often culminate—that the corporate form makes its most sizable con-
tribution to the creation of accountability gaps. IHL-based norms are direct-
ly imposed upon corporate actors but implementation of accountability 
measures, as we see, is largely reliant on domestic initiatives.
218
The indirect 
extension of international law’s regulatory reach has inadequately navigated 
the public-private dimensions of the corporate form. A corporate actor that 
wishes to elude accountability for controversial behavior may avail itself of 
techniques, specific to the corporation, that allow a firm to circumvent in-
212. Id. at 5–6.
213. Id. at 43–44.
214. See Penelope Simons, International Law’s Invisible Hand and the Future of Corpo-
rate Accountability for Violations of Human Rights, 3 J. HUM. RTS. & ENV’T 5 (2012). See
generally Ana María Mondragón, Corporate Impunity for Human Rights Violations in the 
Americas: The Inter-American System of Human Rights as an Opportunity for Victims to 
Achieve Justice, 57 HARV. INT’L. L. J. ONLINE 53 (2016);
215. See Weill, supra note 82, at 873.
216. Id.
217. See Yahli Shereshevsky, HCJ 3003/18 Yesh Din – Volunteers for Human Rights V. 
Chief of General Staff, Israel Defense Forces (IDF), 113 AM. J. INT’L. L. 361, 367–68.
218. Vázquez, supra note 201, at 932; see also Craig Scott, Translating Torture into 
Transnational Tort: Conceptual Divides in the Debate on Corporate Accountability for Hu-
man Rights Harms, in TORTURE AS TORT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 45, 47–48 (Craig Scott, ed., 
2001).
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ternational law’s vertical application. The place of incorporation rule en-
sures that a corporation may select a favoured governance regime.
219
Julian Arato describes how corporations augment their nationality.
220
At 
perhaps the highest level of abstraction, the elastic application of the corpo-
rate form upends the assumption that undergirds much of international law’s
regulatory payoff—that the corporation is solely a construct of national 
law.
221
The widely-shared belief that states are unwilling or unable to regu-
late corporate activity through domestic endeavors prompted the array of 
international initiatives described throughout this article.
222
Yet as interna-
tional law’s regulatory agenda develops, it reverts to the domestic sphere. 
Through indirect obligations that rely upon the state to create and enforce a 
regulatory framework that reflects international norms; to ensure accounta-
bility for conduct implicating those duties prescribed directly, accountability 
gaps widen when features of the corporate form create spaces between in-
ternational initiatives to establish primary rules and the domestic actualiza-
tion of secondary rules. A similar assessment holds when we consider state 
conduct. Here, however, the corporation may avoid formal scrutiny by un-
duly moving between the domestic frameworks upon which international 
norms rely.
223
Choice of law and choice of jurisdiction principles allow the inclined 
corporation to avail of regulatory arbitrage.
224
The commonality of place of 
incorporation rules creates fluid business environments in which a corporate 
entity is enabled to strategically select the domestic regulatory regime that 
219. See Armour et. al., supra note 119, at 21.
220. Arato, supra note 122, at 275 (describing the corporation’s capacity to structure 
investments through subsidiaries to allow it to avail itself of numerous investment treaties that 
the parent would otherwise be unable to access).
221. Id, at 275 (citing the classical formulation in Oppenheim’s International Law: “that 
it is usual to attribute a corporation to the state under the laws of which it has been incorpo-
rated and to which it owes its legal existence”).
222. Fleur Johns, The Invisibility of the Transnational Corporation: An Analysis of In-
ternational Law and Legal Theory, 19 MELB. UNIV. L. REV. 893, 896 (describing that states 
are either incapable or unwilling to assert control over corporate activity); see also Ku, supra 
note 118, at 736 (summarizing the widely-held belief that domestic regulation seems inade-
quate to regulate modern transnational corporations and that international law has become an 
important means of controlling corporate behavior).
223. Arato, supra note 122, at 283. See generally Ronald Daniels & Benjamin Alarie, 
State Regulatory Competition and the Threat to Corporate Governance, in THE ART OF THE 
STATE: GOVERNANCE IN A WORLD WITHOUT FRONTIERS 165 (Thomas Courchene & Donald 
Savoie, eds., 2003).
224. See Magnus Willesson, What Is and What Is Not Regulatory Arbitrage? A Review 
and Syntheses, in FINANCIAL MARKETS, SME FINANCING AND EMERGING ECONOMIES 71 
(Giusy Chesini, Elisa Giaretta & Andrea Paltrinieri, eds., 2017) (in which regulatory arbitrage 
is defined as an avoidance strategy of regulation that is exercised as a result of a regulatory 
inconsistency).
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will govern its, or its subsidiaries, operations.
225
Coupled with aggressive 
regulatory planning, the corporation may effectively minimize legal and 
regulatory constraints.
226
Although arbitrage is generally associated with tax 
reduction, securities disclosures, and similar regulatory costs, the principle 
is transferable. A corporation motivated to bypass domestically imposed in-
ternational legal rules may engage an array of avoidance techniques.
227
Movements to regulate corporate conduct developed upon normative 
assumptions about the nature of the corporation, in response to empirical 
realizations about the influence accrued by corporate actors, and following 
anecdotal accounts of corporate misdeeds. With collective force these ef-
forts counterbalanced the classical formulation that a corporation’s principal 
organizational purpose is to benefit its shareholders.
228
Antonio Cassese 
states that the earliest augmentations to traditional conceptions of legal sub-
jecthood occurred in response to armed conflict.
229
But since Nuremberg’s
expansive promise, efforts to curtail corporate conduct within conflict zones 
have developed haphazardly. The series of patchy frameworks, described 
throughout this section, are increasingly difficult to reconcile with the cor-
porate form. They have resulted in mismatches between primary rules, sec-
ondary rules, and, as will now be seen, the nature of corporate operations.
IV. (Re)Conceptualizing How Corporate Conduct 
Implicates IHL
Friedrich Flick and his associates were indicted as individuals at the 
Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon declared 
that history is replete with examples where great harm has been caused by 
legal persons.
230
In the intervening years, international law’s treatment of 
225. See Armour et al., supra note 119, at 21–22 (describing the prevalence of place of 
incorporation rules in the United States and Europe).
226. See generally Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2010).
227. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A 
Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767, 811–12
(2005) (describing the governance implications of inversion transactions); see also Clifford 
W. Smith, Jr. & Charles W. Smithson, Financial Engineering: An Overview, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL ENGINEERING 3 (Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Charles W. Smithson 
eds., 1990). See generally Michael Knoll, The Ancient Roots of Modern Financial Innovation: 
The Early History of Regulatory Arbitrage, 87 OR. L. REV. 29 (2008).
228. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919) (articulating the classical 
formulation of the view that management must operate within the sole interests of its share-
holders).
229. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 248-249 (2001). See also Ku, supra
note 118, at 734.
230. See Prosecutor v. New TV S.A.L., Case No. STL-14-05/PT/AP/AR126.1, Decision 
on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Personal Jurisdiction in Contempt Proceedings, ¶ 82 
(Oct. 2, 2014).
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corporate conduct has proceeded along different paths.
231
Individualist and 
collectivist, criminal or civil, binding legal obligations versus voluntary un-
dertakings, the intervening developments reflect divergent understandings 
of international law itself. The purpose here has not been to endorse one 
such vision. Instead, this article considers how this bundle of hard and soft 
legal techniques has been applied to corporations that operate within con-
flict zones. The resulting accountability initiatives each share commitment 
to the belief that corporations are powerful entities and that they are capable 
of contributing to social ills. We coalesce around the understanding that 
corporations require regulatory attention but diverge on the means through 
which greater accountability can be prescribed and implemented.
These undertakings are ongoing. The Open-Ended Intergovernmental 
Working Group’s revised draft of the Legally Binding Instrument to Regu-
late the Activities of Transnational Corporations is progressing.
232
The Ec-
uadorian initiative offers the potential of a binding instrument. It provides, 
perhaps, the most detailed consideration of IHL to date.
233
Civil society or-
ganizations, however, note that the draft document inadequately treats cer-
tain particularities of the link between business and conflict and the treaty’s
political prospects remain uncertain.
234
The process of determining how obligations attach to corporations re-
quires a fuller conception of the varying ways that corporate conduct affects 
IHL. As we have observed, features of the corporate form disrupt the appli-
cation of existing accountability frameworks. A more encompassing theory 
of international humanitarian law’s application to business conduct must al-
so recognize how the particularities of corporate conduct influence norms 
derived from IHL. These activities, and the motives that undergird them, 
range from maleficent to banal. The nature of the implicated action tells 
much about the need for the creation of a new, or the reiteration of an exist-
231. Carsten Stahn, Liberals Vs Romantics: Challenges of an Emerging Corporate In-
ternational Criminal Law, 50 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 91, 102–03 (2018) (identifying two 
competing schools, the first based upon the traditional liberal commitment to international 
criminal justice and the second derived from a human rights tradition willing to hold collec-
tive entities responsible for abuses).
232. See Carlos Lopez, The Revised Draft of a Treaty on Business and Human Rights: A 
Big Leap Forward, OPINIO JURIS (Aug. 15, 2019), http://opiniojuris.org/2019/08/15/the-
revised-draft-of-a-treaty-on-business-and-human-rights-a-big-leap-forward/.
233. See U.N. Human Rights Council, Revised Draft of a Legally Binding Instrument to 
Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises, OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS [“OHCHR”] (July 
16, 2019), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp
/OEIGWG_RevisedDraft_LBI.pdf.
234. See e.g. Al-Haq, Submission to the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group 
on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human 
Rights, OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS [“OHCHR”] (Feb. 28, 2019), 
http://www.alhaq.org/cached_uploads/download/alhaq_files/images/stories/PDF/Al-
Haq_Binding_Treaty_IGWG_Call_for_Comments_and_Prop osals_28_February_2019.pdf.
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ing, primary rule; reveals an implementation challenge that affects the mode 
of accountability through which liability can be imposed; or displays some 
mixture of both.
I identify three broad categorizations of corporate activity that each im-
plicate IHL: (i) as a direct violator; (ii) as a facilitator; and (iii) as an inci-
dental contributor.
235
Each categorization encompasses varying levels of le-
gal and moral culpability and affects IHL-based considerations in non-
analogous ways. Corporate activity escapes formal scrutiny when legal 
standards are under-articulated or enforcement is absent. To better answer 
the questions posed by business conduct within conflict zones, we must fur-
ther align the aforementioned primary and secondary rules that regulate cor-
porations with a more complete conceptualization of how the particularities 
of business activity affects norms derived from international humanitarian 
law. The following events are illustrative.
A. The Corporation as a Direct Violator
MALONEY: You fired this individual for handling a weapon 
and being intoxicated, is that right?
PRINCE: The men operate with a clear policy. If there is to be 
any alcohol consumed it’s eight hours between any time of con-
sumption of alcohol. . .
MALONEY: Was he fired or not?
PRINCE: Oh yes, ma’am. He was fired.
MALONEY: OK. Have any charges been brought against him 
in the Iraqi justice system?
PRINCE: I don’t believe, in the Iraqi justice system. I do be-
lieve—I know we’ve referred it over to the. . .
MALONEY: Justice Department. They told us they’re still 
looking at it nine months later. Have any charges been brought 
against him in the U.S. military justice system?
PRINCE: I don’t know.
MALONEY: Have any charges been brought against him in the 
U.S. civilian justice system?
PRINCE: Well, that would be handled by the Justice Depart-
ment, ma’am. I—that’s for them to answer, not me.
MALONEY: Other than firing him, has there been any sanc-
tion against him by any government authority? You mentioned you 
235. I use corporate activity and corporate conduct interchangeably and broadly to de-
scribe the various operations, practices, and objectives that corporations pursue in the course 
of their business operations. I do not intend to limit these considerations to any particular enti-
ty and, as such, they are relevant to various forms of transnational business entities operating 
within conflict zones or externally influencing the conduct of hostilities either directly or indi-
rectly.
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fined people for bad behavior. Was he fined for killing the Iraqi 
guard?
PRINCE: Yes, he was.
MALONEY: How much was he fined?
PRINCE: Multiple thousands of dollars. I don’t know the exact 
number; I’ll have to get you that answer.
MALONEY: OK.
PRINCE: Look, I’m not going to make any apologies for what 
he did.
MALONEY: OK. But. . .
PRINCE: He clearly violated our policies.
MALONEY: All right. We all—every American believes he 
violated policies. If he lived in America, he would have been ar-
rested and he would be facing criminal charges. If he was a mem-
ber of the military, he would be under a court-martial. But it ap-
pears to me that Blackwater has special rules. . .
236
The exchange between Democratic Representative Carolyn Maloney 
and Blackwater CEO Erik Prince concerned a year-old incident.
237
Andrew 
Moonen, a Blackwater employee, left a Christmas party in Baghdad’s Green 
Zone. Stumbling drunk, Moonen approached Raheem Khalif, a security 
guard for Iraq’s Vice-President. Following a brief exchange, Moonen shot 
and killed Khalif.
238
Neither Moonen nor Blackwater faced criminal sanc-
tion.
239
The House Oversight Committee had, however, summoned Prince to 
Washington for a different reason. The precipitating event that invited Con-
gressional scrutiny—the now infamous Nisour Square massacre in which 
seventeen Iraqi civilians were riddled with bullets and killed at a traffic cir-
cle in the once affluent neighborhood—placed Blackwater and the hereto-
fore unfamiliar world of private military contractors within the public con-
sciousness.
240
Committee members queried whether a PMC could be held
accountable for its actions. Throughout the four-hour testimony, Prince 
236. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Holds a Hearing on Pri-
vate Security Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2007) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/articles/blackwater _hearing_100207.html/
[hereinafter Hearing on Private Security Contracting].
237. See Eric Schmitt, Report Details Shooting by Drunken Blackwater Worker, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 2, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/02/world/middleeast/02
shooting.html?fta=y.
238. See John M. Broder, Ex-Paratrooper Is Suspect in a Blackwater Killing, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 4, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/04/world/middleeast/04
contractor.html?hp.
239. James Risen, Efforts to Prosecute Blackwater Are Collapsing, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 
2010), https://www.nytimes. com/2010/10/21/world/21contractors.html.
240. See JEREMY SCAHILL, BLACKWATER: THE RISE OF THE WORLD’S MOST 
POWERFUL MERCENARY ARMY 13–18, 27 (2008).
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faced a barrage of questions and accusations. But there was not a single ref-
erence to IHL or to its regulatory scope.
241
We begin by acknowledging the obscene and the obvious. The spec-
trum of corporate conduct implicating IHL commences with a direct viola-
tion.
242
A corporation that directly breaches IHL assumes high moral and le-
gal culpability. As seen earlier, IHL regulates the conduct of a PMC or other 
business entity whose activities are sufficiently linked to armed conflict.
243
Primary rules impose discernable obligations and secondary rules provide 
various modes of implementation should the business entity disregard rele-
vant legal duties.
244
In such instances, legal frameworks appear sufficiently 
cognizant of the corporation’s capacity to directly violate legal precepts. 
Gaps are not the result of unidentifiable norms but are commonly created by 
inadequate implementation.
245
The observed mismatch between the emerging legal frameworks that 
impose corporate responsibility and the ways that corporations function is 
least severe in instances of a direct violation. New laws are not required. In-
stead, efforts to bridge accountability gaps and reduce regulatory deficits 
that follow from a direct violation are better spent on realigning the primary 
rules with their modes of operationalization. It is necessary to conceptualize 
how the nature of corporate conduct, implicating IHL, eludes accountability 
and how the resulting gaps differ from the familiar implementation chal-
lenges associated with state conduct. At least two factors differentiate the 
corporate violation and affect the manner in which accountability frame-
works are transposed from the state actor and applied to the corporate entity.
First: dispersed responsibility. When a state violates IHL, a clear line 
runs from the existence of a duty, through the offending action, and to the 
mode(s) of imposing accountability for the breach (even if implementation 
241. Hearing on Private Security Contracting, supra note 236.
242. See HRC Standards of Responsibility, supra note 132, ¶ 30.
243. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 83, art. 144(2) (extending the obligation 
to “other authorities” that assume responsibilities in respect of protected persons to be in-
structed as to the Conventions provisions); ARSIWA, supra note 138, arts. 5, 8 (extending a 
state act to non-state entities empowered by the state and imposing responsibility on the state 
for actions of individuals or groups exercising governmental authority); see also The Int’l
Committee for the Red Cross [ICRC], The Montreux Document on Private Military and Secu-
rity Companies, ref. 0996 (Sept. 17, 2008) (applying the principle of superior responsibility to 
the relationship between the state and PMCs). See generally Louise Doswald-Beck, Private 
Military Companies under International Humanitarian Law, in FROM MERCENARIES TO 
MARKET: THE RISE AND REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 115 (Simon Ches-
terman & Chia Lehnardt, eds., 2007).
244. See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW VOL 1: RULES 551– 55 (2005) (detailing the custom-
ary nature of Rule 151 regarding individual responsibility for violations of IHL).
245. U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 76, at 8 (noting that failure to enforce existing 
laws that directly or indirectly regulate business respect for human rights constitutes a signifi-
cant legal gap).
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is inadequate). Deviations from this linearity occur when a corporation vio-
lates a primary rule. It is not immediately clear where accountability is most 
effectively pursued. The place of incorporation, the jurisdiction in which the 
violation occurred, and the home state of an implicated individual each pro-
vide potential venues.
246
However, the proximity between the state and the 
corporation influences accountability and creates a degree of separation not 
otherwise present.
Home states are often unable or unwilling to monitor a corporation’s
IHL compliance. A PMC, for example, works throughout the world and for 
various clients. A host state is best positioned to monitor the PMC’s adher-
ence to legal requirements but this ability decreases when the PMC works 
alongside foreign governments or other businesses.
247
A host state will be in 
close proximity to the violation. It is positioned to undertake investigative 
obligations and impose accountability but a host state may prioritize low 
regulatory barriers or lack enforcement capacity.
248
As experienced in Iraq,
this lack of capacity can result from the imposition of terms by the home 
state that insulate the corporation and complicate the host state’s ability to 
implement secondary rules.
249
Proximity is furthest removed in relation to 
the state of an implicated individual. A home state whose national may have 
violated IHL in a third-country is rarely positioned to monitor or address the 
geographically varied corporate undertakings of their citizens abroad.
250
Second: the strategic value of the provided service. The implicated 
business practice is likely to avoid international legal scrutiny if the corpo-
ration provides a service deemed indispensable by the host state. When ap-
plied to a corporation, accountability mechanisms are largely reliant upon 
the state—the state that may derive enormous benefit from the corpora-
tion—to implement IHL-based constraints on the business whose conduct 
constitutes a direct violation. PMCs like Executive Outcomes and Military 
Professional Resources Inc. secured desired military results within protract-
246. See Benjamin Perrin, Promoting Compliance of Private Security and Military 
Companies with International Humanitarian Law, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 613, 615 
(2006).
247. Id. at 616.
248. Carlos Ortiz, Regulating Private Military Companies: States and the Expanding 
Business of Commercial Security Provision, in GLOBAL REGULATION: MANAGING CRISES 
AFTER THE IMPERIAL TURN 214, 218 (Kees van der Pijl, Libby Assassi & Duncan Wigan 
eds., 2004).
249. See Status of the Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17 of 2004 (Iraq) (stating 
that Contractors shall not be subject to Iraqi laws or regulations in matters relating to the terms 
and conditions of their Contracts. . . and that Contractors shall be immune from Iraqi legal 
process with respect to acts preformed by them pursuant to the terms and conditions of a Con-
tract or any sub-contract thereto).
250. Perrin, supra note 246, at 618–19.
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ed conflicts.
251
Blackwater was repeatedly praised, even by its detractors in 
Congress, for providing security services and protecting U.S. officials.
252
Ef-
forts to further regulate Blackwater were opposed by President Bush. Ad-
ministration officials sought to ensure immunity for PMCs through a re-
newed Status of Force agreement with Iraq.
253
The President pronounced 
that efforts to investigate Blackwater’s conduct would inhibit the ability of 
the Presidency to protect national security.
254
Beyond such hyperbole, an inevitable tension results when the actor re-
sponsible for imposing accountability is beholden to the entity whose con-
duct is to be scrutinized. During Erik Prince’s Congressional testimony, 
Representative Stephen Lynch noted:
The State Department employees, you protect them every sin-
gle day. . .And I am sure there is a heavy debt of gratitude on the 
part of the State Department for your service. And yet they are the 
same people who are, in our system, responsible for holding you 
accountable in every respect with your contract and the conduct of 
your employees. . .that’s an impossible conflict for them to re-
solve.
255
The modes of imposing accountability are broader than Representative 
Lynch suggests yet the acknowledged tension is real. Four Blackwater con-
tractors were eventually charged following the Nisour Square massacre. Ini-
tially, their prosecution was dismissed by a Federal Court judge.
256
Then,
facing mounting political pressure and at the behest of Vice-President 
Biden, the Obama Administration appealed the dismissal.
257
In 2014, the 
contractors were convicted on various charges including first-degree murder 
and voluntary manslaughter.
258
Following a succession of appeals, an addi-
tional dismissal, and a retrial, the convictions were affirmed but the sen-
251. Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt, Introduction, in FROM MERCENARIES TO 
MARKET: THE RISE AND REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 1, 1 (Simon Ches-
terman & Chia Lehnardt, eds., 2007).
252. See Hearing on Private Security Contracting, supra note 236; see also SCAHILL, 
supra note 240, at 18 (citing President Bush commending Blackwater’s sacrifice and service 
in Iraq).
253. SCAHILL, supra note 240, at 53.
254. See Press Release, The White House President Bush Signs H.R. 4986, the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 into Law (Jan. 28, 2008), 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases /2008/01/20080128-10.html.
255. Hearing on Private Security Contracting, supra note 236.
256. United States v. Slough, CR 08-0360 RMU,  677 F.Supp.2d 112(D.D.C., Dec. 31, 
2009).
257. Anthony Shadid, Biden Says U.S. Will Appeal Blackwater Case Dismissal, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 23, 2010),  https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/24/ world/middleeast/24iraq.html
258. Matt Apuzzo, Blackwater Guards Found Guilty in 2007 Iraq Killings, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 22, 2014),  https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/us/ blackwater-verdict.html.
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tences of three of the contractors would be halved.
259
This modicum of jus-
tice was fleeting. Late in 2020, in the dwindling days of the Trump Admin-
istration, the President fully pardoned the four Blackwater contractors while 
commending their service to the country.
260
Accountability frameworks are heavily dependent on the state to restrict 
activity that serves the state’s interests. Of course, this is also true of many 
legal expectations imposed upon a state whose own activities violate IHL.
261
Here, however, we suppose that legal engagement follows from the state’s
desire to, inter alia, benefit from the principle of reciprocity and avoid or 
minimize reputational costs.
262
Firms too, especially those that are public-
facing, experience reputational consequences.
263
These can be considerable 
but the concept of corporate resilience facilitates reinvention. Following the 
Nisour Square massacre, Blackwater rebranded. It commissioned a widely-
circulated video game in which players become heroic contractors entrusted 
to protect aid workers in a fictional North African country besieged by war-
lords.
264
Blackwater changed its ownership and board structure, altered its 
name twice, and merged with another PMC.
265
Notwithstanding Iraq’s re-
fusal to renew Blackwater’s operational license, the new iteration of the 
firm and its various subsidiaries continue to obtain profitable contracts from 
the State Department.
266
And, in August 2020, Erik Prince, who had left the 
firm before its corporate reinvention but maintained his company’s trade-
259. Sarah Grant, Trial Preview: Third Attempt to Convict Blackwater Guard for 2007 
Massacre of Iraqi Civilians, LAWFARE (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/trial-
preview-third-attempt-convict-blackwater-guard-2007-massacre-iraqi-civilians.
260. Maggie Haberman & Michael S. Schmidt, Trump Pardons Two Russia Inquiry 
Figures and Blackwater Guards, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 22, 2020), available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/22/us/politics/trump-pardons.html. See also WHITE 
HOUSE, Statement from the Press Secretary Regarding Executive Grants of Clemency, (Dec.
22, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-
regarding-executive-grants-clemency-122220/.
261. See, e.g., ARSIWA, supra note 138, arts. 30–31 (requiring a responsible state to 
cease a wrongful act; provide guarantees of non-repetition, and make full reparations for the 
injury caused).
262. See generally ANDREW GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008).
263. See generally Bennett Freeman, Substance Sells: Aligning Corporate Reputation 
with Corporate Responsibility, 51 PUB. RELS. Q. 12 (2006).
264. Owen Good, Real-Life Mercenaries to Star in Blackwater, the Videogame, WIRED
(June 7, 2011), https://www. wired.com/2011/ 06/real-life-mercenaries-to-star-in-blackwater-
the-video-game/.
265. Dara Lind, Why Four Blackwater Contractors Were Just Now Convicted of Killing 
17 Iraqi Civilians in 2007, VOX (Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.vox.com/2014/10/23/7047519
/blackwater-trial-nisour-square-massacre-2007-guilty-convicted.
266. Id.
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mark announced in a radio interview that he was again providing security 
services before defiantly concluding, “Blackwater is back.”
267
B. The Corporation as a Facilitator
The motto of Myanmar’s Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Popula-
tion is displayed on the walls of the bureaucracy’s offices in Naypyidaw: 
The earth will not swallow a race to extinction but another race will.268 This 
visceral message—encapsulating the nation’s ethnic divisions and motivat-
ing the systemic oppression of Myanmar’s Rohingya minority—culminated 
in the 2017 “clearance operations.”
269
On August 25, in the early morning, 
the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (“ARSA”) launched a series of at-
tacks against military installations in Northern Rakhine State. The United 
Nation’s Fact-Finding Mission (“FFM”) would later describe the state’s re-
sponse to the attacks as “brutal and grossly disproportionate.”
270
The FFM 
report followed a familiar pattern. It provided background, set contexts, es-
tablished facts, and studied events. It assessed the impact of policies that 
amounted to egregious violations of international law. Deep inside the 441-
page report, within a section addressing the prevalence of hate speech, the 
report’s authors identified and assessed the responsibility of an unexpected 
actor—Facebook.
Facebook was adjudged to have enabled the spread of hateful rhetoric 
that contributed to circumstances that, for two months in 2017, saw entire 
segments of the Rohingya population targeted.
271
Forty percent of the villag-
es in Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Rathedaung were destroyed.
272
Médecins 
Sans Frontières estimated that as many as 9,000 were killed during the first 
month of violence.
273
725,000 were forced to leave their homes and flee to 
267. Seth Hettena, Erik Prince’s Private Wars, ROLLING STONE, (Oct. 25, 2020),  
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/erik-prince-libya-blackwater-roger-
stone-trump-2020-election-1077089/.
268. Thomas Manch, For Muslims Across Myanmar, Citizenship Rights a Legal Fiction,
JUSTICEINFO (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/truth-commissions/36058-for-
muslims-across-myanmar-citizenship-rights-a-legal-fiction.html.
269. Stephanie Nebehay, Brutal Myanmar Army Operation Aimed at Preventing Roh-
ingya Return: U.N., REUTERS (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-
rohingya-un/brutal-myanmar-army-operation-aimed-at-preventing-rohingya-return-u-n-
idUSKBN1CG10A
270. U.N. Hum Rts. Council, Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent Inter-
national Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, ¶ 751, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/CRP.2 (Sept. 17, 
2018) [hereinafter U.N. FFM].
271. See id.
272. See id. ¶ 959.
273. MSF Surveys Estimate That at Least 6,700 Rohingya Were Killed During the At-
tacks in Myanmar, MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.msf.org
/myanmarbangladesh-msf-surveys-estimate-least-6700-rohingya-were-killed-during-attacks-
myanmar.
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Bangladesh.
274
The events were characterized, in a near-unanimous vote by 
the U.S. House of Representatives as constituting genocide.
275
The ongoing 
campaign featured a series of recurring attacks. Infantry divisions from the 
Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s military, partnered with sympathetic armed groups 
and ethnic Rakhine civilians. They set fire to entire townships. They shot 
indiscriminately into homes and at masses of people. The FFM found that 
the operations were pre-determined. They were consistent with the vision of 
General Min Aung Hlaing, the Commander-in-Chief of the Tatmadaw who 
commenced the assault on Rakhine State by declaring: “The [Rohingya] 
problem was a long-standing one which has become an unfinished job de-
spite the efforts of the previous governments to solve it. The government in 
office is taking great care to solve the problem.”
276
The clearance operations disregarded civilian life. They sought to dispel 
an entire population. A series of IHL and human rights violations were doc-
umented. Movement was restricted, forced evictions common, humanitarian 
access was denied, and food and property were frequently confiscated. Sex-
ual and gender-based violence became routine. The Tatmadaw ignored the 
principle of distinction. They failed to take any feasible precautions to min-
imize incidental harm. Myanmar’s conduct was disproportionate and consti-
tuted a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing,” said the High Commission-
er for Human Rights.
277
Ethnic conflict is almost always preceded by long campaigns of de-
nouncement, nationalism, and dehumanization. Sporadic occurrences of 
ethnic violence had become periodic features of Myanmar’s transition from 
military rule. In Shan State in 2011 and the following year in Northern 
Rakhine—as foreign investment followed democratic reforms and as Aung 
San Suu Kyi entered Parliament—violent outbreaks became harbingers of 
the sustained series of atrocities that culminated in the clearance operations. 
One event was notable. In 2014, riots in Mandalay began after rumors circu-
lated that a Muslim café owner had raped a Buddhist employee. The accusa-
tion was false. It was manufactured to raise tensions, to sow intercommunal 
discord.
278
Such forms of incitement had occurred in the past but now the 
274. U.N. FFM, supra note 270, ¶ 751.
275. See Nahal Toosi, House Calls Rohingya Crisis a Genocide, Urges Pompeo to Take 
a Stand, POLITICO (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/13/rohingya-
house-resolution-pompeo-1063111.
276. U.N. FFM, supra note 270, ¶ 752.
277. Id, ¶¶ 1275–1286; Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, Darker and More Dangerous: High 
Commissioner Updates the Human Rights Council on Human Rights Issues in 40 Countries,
OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS [“OHCHR”] (Sept. 11, 2017), 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/News Events/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22041&Lang
ID=E.
278. See Timothy McLaughlin, How Facebook’s Rise Fueled Chaos and Confusion in 
Myanmar, WIRED (June 7, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/how-facebooks-rise-fueled-
chaos-and-confusion-in-myanmar/; see also U.N. FFM, supra note 270, ¶ 744 (detailing how 
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reach of disinformation carried an unforetold scope as the incitement cam-
paign against Myanmar’s Rohingya minority was fostered, and then dissem-
inated, via Facebook.
Five years earlier, less than one percent of the country’s population reg-
ularly accessed the internet. Following liberalization, Facebook became 
ubiquitous, the importance of an online profile likened to the necessity of a 
home address.
279
In Myanmar, the social network experienced its fastest 
growth of any global market.
280
In 2017, Myanmar’s 18 million users, a plu-
rality of the country’s population, received some or all of their news from 
the website.
281
Tensions between the Rohingya and segments of the Bud-
dhist majority grew as Facebook increased its national reach and influence. 
While patterns of online disinformation and incitement are commonplace, 
their occurrence in Myanmar has been deemed distinctive.
282
Hateful rheto-
ric spread and carried salience amongst a population that had only recently 
embraced social networks. Facebook actively courted market share in My-
anmar. Network providers incentivized the use of the social media site. In 
2016, Facebook joined with Myanmar Post and Telecommunications to 
launch specific versions of the platform that were designed to maximize us-
age and reliance.
283
Notwithstanding the benefits of increased communication and 
knowledge dissemination, the Rohingya were subjected to a centralized dis-
information campaign.
284
The U.N. Fact-Finding Mission documented myri-
ad postings. These reached millions of users. Often, the messages originated 
from state officials or influential community and religious leaders. Through 
Facebook posts, users were cautioned of an impending “Islamic takeover”
and warned of the harm that the Muslim population posed to the Buddhist 
majority.
285
The Rohingya were the subject of dismissive screeds that ech-
oed familiar tropes of dehumanization. The FFM cited the facilitatory effect 
of this hate speech and incitement.
286
“outside instigators” paid the accusers and sought to instigate violence in response to the al-
leged crimes).
279. See McLaughlin, supra note 278.
280. Id.
281. Id.; see also Survey of Burma/Myanmar Public Opinion: March 9-April 1, 2017,
INT’L REPUBLICAN INST. 46 (2017), https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files
/8.25.2017_burma_public_poll.pdf (noting that 73% of those surveyed received either all, 
most, or some of their news from Facebook).
282. U.N. FFM, supra note 270, ¶ 1342.
283. Id. ¶ 1344 (noting that the launch of the “Free Basics” and “Facebook Flex” ver-
sions of the site were specifically designed for Myanmar and would allow users to access a 
stripped-down form of Facebook without incurring data charges from their network provider).
284. Id. ¶ 1346.
285. Id. ¶ 1347.
286. Id. ¶ 1354.
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Facebook’s role was noticeable. Civil society organizations warned that 
Facebook’s investment in Myanmar was not commensurate with its efforts 
to regulate the use of its platform.
287
Facebook was accused of minimizing 
its enablement of harmful rhetoric and of failing to impart processes to stem 
the flow of information that would lead to violence.
288
Subsequent efforts, 
pledged by the firm’s leadership following increasing attention and negative 
publicity, were widely dismissed by industry observers as insufficient.
289
Critics noted that Facebook had, since at least the 2014 Mandalay riots, 
been aware of how its platform facilitated violence in Myanmar.
290
Despite 
functioning as the nation’s preeminent communicative medium, Facebook 
had failed to cooperate with the FFM’s efforts to further diagnose the extent 
of the social network’s contributory role.
291
The fact-finding report called 
for further research into the ways that Facebook contributed to the increase 
of discrimination and violence in Myanmar.
292
And, more recently, in early 
June 2020, The Gambia initiated discovery proceedings in a U.S. District 
Court to compel Facebook to provide data concerning various Burmese of-
ficials.
293
The discovery attempt is intended to support The Gambia’s ICJ 
case, currently pending against Myanmar, for breach of the 1948 Genocide 
Convention.
294
Business operations, contemporary models that implicate IHL, fre-
quently diverge from the well-regulated, paradigmatic case of the military 
contractor. Commonly, the corporation assumes a secondary or faciliatory 
287. See Open Letter from Six Myanmar Civil Society Organizations to Mark Zucker-
berg, (Apr. 5, 2018), https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Rs02G96Y9w5dpX0Vf1LjWp6B9
mp32VY-/view [hereinafter Open Letter], see also Paul Mozur, Groups in Myanmar Fire 
Back at Zuckerberg, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/05/ tech-
nology/zuckerberg-facebook-myanmar.html
288. See Open Letter, supra note 287 (noting that Facebook over-relies on third-party 
moderators, lacks necessary mechanisms for emergency escalation, did not engage local 
stakeholders, and failed to ensure transparency).
289. See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 287 (noting Mark Zuckerberg’s response to ques-
tions in a Congressional hearing in which he stated that Facebook would increase its local 
language content reviews, remove accounts that generated hate speech, and introduce market-
specific products).
290. Id.
291. U.N. FFM, supra note 270, ¶ 1354.
292. Id.
293. Application for Order to Take Discovery Pursuant to 28 U.S.C §1782, The Repub-
lic of The Gambia v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-mc-00036-JEB (D.D.C. filed June 8, 2020), 
https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.218820/gov.uscourts.dcd. 
218820.1.1.pdf.
294. See generally Jenny Domino, Gambia V. Facebook: What the Discovery Request 
Reveals About Facebook’s Content Moderation, JUST SEC. (July 6, 2020), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/71157/gambia-v-facebook-what-the-discovery-request-reveals-
about-facebooks-content-moderation/.
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role.
295
The nature of this role, the form of corporate conduct, dictates the 
level of legal or moral culpability that attaches to the business entity. Exam-
ples range.
296
Actions deemed purposefully faciliatory may reach the level 
of aiding and abetting. Here, the corporation becomes an accomplice. Such 
occurrences are familiar and international criminal law and domestic legal 
mechanisms impose accountability in such instances. Gaps result from inad-
equate implementation, often caused by a narrowly construed notion of 
complicity.
297
Commonly, the corporation’s contribution to the facilitatory act will be 
less direct.
298
Faciliatory contributions, as defined here, include instances in 
which the corporation purposefully aligns or willfully neglects the relation-
ship between business operations and the consequences of its actions. Moral 
culpability may be reduced in such instances. The corporation’s conduct 
may not exhibit the purposeful intent required by the ICTY and the ILC to 
establish the crime of complicity under international criminal law.
299
But as 
witnessed in Myanmar, corporate activity (or inactivity) can affect IHL in
unforeseen ways. In such scenarios, the corporation does not directly con-
tribute to the implicated events. The proximate cause is further removed. 
Instead, the corporation may derive benefit. It neglects the harmful implica-
tions of its actions or inactions. And, increasingly through new technologies 
and novel business models, the corporate contribution becomes a conduit 
that facilitates activity that itself compromises IHL-based norms.
Once described as a drama of great complexity and intensity, under-
standings of complicity have broadened since the Statute of the International 
Military Tribunal extended responsibility to those “instigators and accom-
plices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or 
conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes. . .”
300
Today, understand-
295. Stephen J. Kobrin, Private Political Authority and Public Responsibility: Transna-
tional Politics, Transnational Firms, and Human Rights, 19 BUS. ETHICS Q. 349, 351 (2009).
296. U.N. Global Compact, supra note 67, at Principle 2 (acknowledging that complicity 
may be direct, beneficial, or silent).
297. See Wolfgang Kaleck & Miriam Saage-Maaß, Corporate Accountability for Human 
Rights Violations Amounting to International Crimes: The Status Quo and its Challenges, 8 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 699, 702 (2010).
298. U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises: A Survey of the Scope and Patterns of Alleged Corporate-Related Human Rights 
Abuses, ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5/Add.2 (May 23, 2008) (finding that 41% of the incidents 
surveyed featured indirect human rights violations by corporations).
299. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 674 (holding that a 
complicit actor must knowingly decide to participate in the planning, instigating, ordering, 
committing, or aiding and abetting in the commission of a crime); see also ILC, Crimes 
Against Peace and Security, supra note 146,  art. 2(3)(d).
300. See Eighth Report on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace of Mankind, ¶ 
38, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/430 (Apr. 6, 1990) (citing Special Rapporteur Doudou Thiam who 
notes the complexity of defining complicity); see also IMT Statute, supra note 28, art. 6.
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ings of corporate complicity may impose ethical or legal consequences.
301
The nature of the requisite material act and the degree to which an actor 
must contribute to the commission of a crime remain open questions.
302
Dis-
crepancies between knowledge and purpose-based standards delineate asso-
ciated legal debates.
303
Whether a secondary actor that facilitates a primary 
violation is criminally complicit or ethically compromised is both fact-
specific and is influenced by the particular regime applied to reach a deter-
mination.
304
But my immediate purpose here is not prescriptive. Instead, it is to 
acknowledge that as the relevant accountability frameworks develop, it is 
necessary to forefront expansive conceptions of complicity with fuller ac-
counts of how varying forms of corporate conduct indirectly implicate IHL 
norms. Corporate activity reaches further than previously foreseen, expand-
ing the proximity between the implicated conduct and the principle harm. 
The influence of hate speech and false information, disseminated through 
social media platforms, now receives heightened attention.
305
Yet numerous 
forms of corporate activity—emanating from new sectors and manifesting 
in under-regulated spaces—are rapidly developing. The ways in which these 
developments will influence IHL remain under-conceptualized. Seven of the 
ten largest companies in the world are now technology firms.
306
Within this 
sector alone, rapidly evolving services, provided by the world’s largest 
companies, present emerging challenges to the legal frameworks that govern 
the conduct of warfare.
In 2013, the Islamic State began using YouTube and Twitter to recruit, 
fundraise, and train thousands of foreign fighters.
307
Soon, so too were each 
301. See Andrew Clapham, Corporations and Criminal Complicity, in HUMAN RIGHTS,
CORPORATE COMPLICITY AND DISINVESTMENT 222, 223 (Gro Nystuen, et al., eds., 2011) 
(citing the Norwegian Council on Ethics and Government Pension Fund – Global whose 
guidelines promote a dualist approach to account for corporate conduct that violates interna-
tional law or constitutes unethical corporate behavior not amounting to a legal violation) 
[hereinafter Clapham, Criminal Complicity].
302. Schabas, supra note 11, at 447.
303. Clapham, Criminal Complicity, supra note 301, at 231.
304. See HRC Clarifying Complicity, supra note 175, ¶¶ 33–62.
305. See generally Eitan Diamond, Killing on Camera: Visual Evidence, Denial and 
Accountability in Armed Conflict, 6 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 361 (2018). See also Tamar Me-
giddo, Online Activism, Digital Domination, and the Rule of Trolls: Mapping and Theorizing 
Technological Oppression by Governments, 58 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 394 (2020); 
Björnstjern Baade, Fake News and International Law, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1357 (2019); Eve-
lyn Douek, Australia’s New Social Media Law Is a Mess, LAWFARE (Apr. 10, 2019), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/australias-new-social-media-law-mess.
306. Luca Ventura, World’s Largest Companies 2019, GLOB. FIN. (Aug. 29, 2019), 
https://www.gfmag.com/ global-data/economic-data/largest-companies (noting the ten largest 
companies as measured by market capitalization).
307. See Scott Gates & Sukanya Podder, Social Media, Recruitment, Allegiance and the 
Islamic State, 9 PERSP. ON TERRORISM 107 (2015).
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of the numerous non-state armed groups operating in Syria.
308
Israel’s Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs funded an “internet warfare squad.”
309
During Oper-
ation Pillar of Defense in the Gaza Strip, the Israel Defense Forces (“IDF”)
and Hamas both employed a social media strategy to present competing nar-
ratives.
310
The IDF’s targeting and operational decisions were influenced by 
social media determinations.
311
When the ICC indicted Mahmoud Al-
Werfalli in 2017, the decision was based upon evidence found on popular 
video sharing sites.
312
The NGO Bellingcat used images and videos captured 
from across the internet to determine that a Russian supplied surface-to-air 
missile was used to down Flight MH17 in Ukraine.
313
And  the Defense Ad-
vanced Research Projects Agency (“DARPA”) publicized its ongoing re-
search on “military memetics” which analyzes the weaponization of memes 
as part of information warfare and influence operations.
314
Social media now affects how conflicts are initiated. It has altered the 
capacity and reach of non-state armed groups. It contributes to determina-
tions of when and how force will be deployed, the manner in which legiti-
macy is asserted, and the enforcement and monitoring of international law. 
IHL provides guidance on some of these emerging questions. Ruses of war 
are permitted practices but IHL prohibits acts of perfidy.
315
As per the First 
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, misinformation constitutes 
a ruse.
316
The Tallinn Manual clarifies that transmitting false information is 
permissible.
317
This has been interpreted to include the dissemination of 
308. P.W. SINGER & EMERSON T. BROOKING, LIKE WAR: THE WEAPONIZATION OF 
SOCIAL MEDIA 9 (2018).
309. Rona Kuperboim, Thought-Police Is Here, YNET NEWS, (Oct. 7, 2009), 
https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/ 0,7340,L-3744516 ,00.html.
310. SINGER & BROOKING, supra note 308, at 194-195.
311. Id. at 9.
312. Emma Irving, And So It Begins. . .Social Media Evidence in an ICC Arrest War-
rant, OPINIO JURIS, (Aug. 17, 2017), http://opiniojuris.org/2017/08/17/and-so-it-begins-social-
media-evidence-in-an-icc-arrest-warrant/.
313. Bellingcat, “A Birdie is Flying Towards You:” Identifying the Separatists Linked to 
the Downing of MH17, BELLINGCAT (June 19, 2019), https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-
and-europe/2019/06/19/identifying-the-separatists-linked-to-the-downing-of-mh17/.
314. SINGER & BROOKING, supra note 308, at 191; see also Memes That Kill: The Fu-
ture of Information Warfare, CB INSIGHTS (May 3, 2018), https://www.cbinsights.com
/research/future-of-information-warfare/.
315. See Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
arts. 23(b), 24, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 539 T.S. 631 (stating that it is forbidden “to kill 
or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army” and “ruses of war 
and the employment of methods necessary for obtaining information about the enemy and the 
country are considered permissible”).
316. First Additional Protocol, supra note 19, at art. 37(2).
317. TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
WARFARE, Rule 61 (Michael N. Schmitt, ed., 2017).
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“fake news.”
318
Yet, as observed in Myanmar, misleading communications 
can threaten peremptory norms. To determine how an evolving understand-
ing of complicity may ensure accountability for corporate conduct that af-
fects IHL in previously uncontemplated ways we must more fully conceptu-
alize the emerging forms of corporate behaviour—intentional and inci-
incidental—and how these encroach upon IHL’s normative purpose.
C. The Corporation as an Incidental Contributor
From your computer, enter a familiar URL. Through a trusted site at the 
forefront of the shared economy, one scrolls through vacation rentals in Is-
rael. Accommodation in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv has become prohibitively 
expensive. Move further from your preferred destination and you find more 
for less. Listed at $344 per week, through Airbnb, one can book a “double 
room in a spacious modern flat in the center of Ariel.”
319
Two people may 
stay in the private room, fully furnished with a double bed. It features a fire-
place and offers convenience. The advert tells that Ariel is suitably located 
with easy access to all main highways.
320
It is an hour on the bus to the 
beach or a 45-minute drive to the Old City’s holy sites. The advert, howev-
er, omits that Ariel is a large Israeli settlement located in the heart of the 
West Bank. It omits that the shared flat has been constructed on occupied 
territory and in violation of Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion.
321
Instead, the advert tells guests that Ariel is not merely contiguous 
with, but incontrovertibly constitutes a part of, Israel.
Airbnb has become embroiled in an ongoing debate regarding the con-
duct of business within occupied territory.
322
In November 2018, Airbnb is-
sued a press release. Responding to critics, it conceded: “when we applied 
our decision-making framework, we concluded that we should remove list-
318. See Unnati Ghia, International Humanitarian Law in a Post-Truth World,
CAMBRIDGE INT’L L.J. POST (Dec. 17, 2018), http://cilj.co.uk/2018/12/17/international-
humanitarian-law-in-a-post-truth-world/.
319. Double Bedroom in a Welcoming Flat, AIRBNB, www.airbnb.ca/rooms
/8470399?source_impression_id= p31569495341vAsxAkr %2Bojsuh2Sk&guests=1&adults=
1&sl_alternate_dates_exclusion=true&check_in=2019-10 -02&check_out=2019-10-09 (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2020).
320. Id.
321. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 83, art. 49(6); see S.C. Res. 446, ¶ 3 (Mar. 
22, 1979); G.A. Res. 32/20, ¶ 1 (Nov. 25, 1977) (affirming Israel’s presence within the West 
Bank constitutes a belligerent occupation); see also David Hughes, Moving from Management 
to Termination: A Case Study of Prolonged Occupation, 44 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 109 (2018).
322. See, e.g., Hum.  Rts. Watch, Bed and Breakfast on Stolen Land: Tourist Rental List-
ings in West Bank Settlements (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/11/20/bed-
and-breakfast-stolen-land/tourist-rental-listings-west-bank-settlements; see also Stolen Homes 
Campaign, JEWISH VOICES FOR PEACE, https://jewish voiceforpeace.org/stolen-homes/ (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2020) (a joint-campaign between American Muslims for Palestine, 
CODEPINK: Women for Peace, Friends of Sabeel North America, Jewish Voice for Peace, 
SumOfUs, and the US Palestinian Community Network).
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ings in Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank that are at the core of 
the dispute between Israelis and Palestinians.”
323
Controversy was immedi-
ate. Israel denounced the decision as “shameful” and promised legal ac-
tion.
324
Lawyers were retained and suits were filed.
325
The Simon Wiesenthal 
Center called the delisting draconian, a move that empowered terrorists, and 
demanded a worldwide boycott of Airbnb.
326
Without hesitation, the Texas 
Comptroller of Public Accounts placed Airbnb on a blacklist of companies 
that boycott Israel.
327
Florida threatened retaliatory action. Governor DeSan-
tis warned that the company would be placed on a “hit list” and Vice-
President Pence promised his Administration would make it clear that the 
delisting “has no place in the free enterprise of the United States of Ameri-
ca.”
328
In April 2019, Airbnb reversed its decision.
329
Today, owners may list and users may rent properties in West Bank set-
tlements. The legal rejoinders offered both to the initial delisting and in re-
sponse to the subsequent reversal follow identifiable paths. In Silber et al. v. 
Airbnb, a group of Israeli-Americans that owned and listed West Bank 
properties on the website and a group that identified as prospective renters 
told the U.S. District Court of Delaware that the decision to remove their 
property violated the Fair Housing Act.330 Their claim was settled and the 
323. Listings in Disputed Regions, AIRBNB (Nov. 19, 2019), https://press.airbnb.com
/listings-in-disputed-regions/.
324. Airbnb: Israeli Uproar as Firm Bars West Bank Settlements, BBC NEWS (Nov. 20, 
2018), https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-middle-east-46273938.
325. See Amanda McCaffrey, Palestinians Claim Violations by Israeli Settlers in Airbnb 
Case in U.S. Courts, JUST SEC. (May 7, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/63938
/palestinians-claim-violations-by-israeli-settlers-in-airbnb-case-in-u-s-court/.
326. Hugo Martin, Airbnb Won’t Operate in Israel’s West Bank, Prompting Calls for a 
Boycott, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-airbnb-west-
bank-20181119-story.html.
327. Marcy Oster, Texas Blacklists Airbnb Over Israeli Settlement Boycott, HAARETZ
(Mar. 4, 2019), https://www. haaretz.com/israel-news/texas-blacklists-airbnb-over-israeli-
settlement-boycott-1.6983940.
328. David Simley, Florida Governor Warns Airbnb to Reverse its West Bank Policy or 
Face State Sanctions, MIA. HERALD (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.miamiherald.com/news
/politics-government/state-politics/article224556770. Html; see also Ron Kampeas, Pence on 
Airbnb Settlements Ban: BDS Has ‘No Place’ in U.S. Market, HAARETZ (Dec. 2, 2018), 
https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/pence-on-airbnb-settlements-ban-bds-has-no-place-in-u-s-
market-1.670 2127.
329. Julia Jacobs, Airbnb Reverses Policy Banning Listings in Israeli Settlements in 
West Bank, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/09/world
/middleeast/airbnb-israel-west-bank.html.
330. Amended Complaint at 9, Silber v. Airbnb, Inc., 2019 WL 3997098 (D. Del. Aug. 
23, 2019) (No. 1:18-cv-01884-RGA), https://www.just security.org/wp-content/uploads/2019
/04/Silber-Amended-Complaint.pdf.
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case dismissed.
331
Under the terms of the settlement, Airbnb reiterated that 
“it would not move forward with implementing the removal of listings in 
the West Bank from the platform.”
332
When stripped of its political veneer, the described events, tell of a cor-
porate entity whose business practice in the West Bank may be understood 
as mirroring its corporate conduct elsewhere. Airbnb operates in Ariel as it 
does in Tel Aviv, Madrid, or Tokyo. Its policy in the Palestinian territories 
attracts scrutiny not due to the nature of Airbnb’s general operations but be-
cause of the context within which these occur. The proximity between the 
corporate action and the primary harm is greater than that which constitutes 
faciliatory conduct. Unlike Facebook’s operations in Myanmar, which were 
purposely tailored to the market and are alleged to have neglected the harm 
caused, corporate operations are unchanged. Here, the implicated action 
would likely fail to meet even a low complicity threshold.
333
The corporation 
does not engage in a positive act or omission that then contributes to the im-
plicated behavior.
334
In such instances, corporate conduct affecting IHL is 
incidental. It is a subsidiary contribution that supplements a more direct 
form of (likely state) conduct.
Courts have traditionally maintained that corporations are not liable, 
criminally or civilly, when their conduct amounts to normal business prac-
tice.
335
Incidental contributions occur within the scope of regular operations 
when corporate officials are unaware of the state’s intentions or the conse-
quences of their actions. However, in such instances the nature of corporate 
operations can further the interests that the primary (state) actor wishes to 
impose. This may affect IHL’s normative purpose in ways that are often ab-
sent from associated deliberations.
In the Airbnb case, proponents viewed the initial removal decision as 
advancing corporate accountability.
336
Several Palestinian groups, interven-
ing in Silber, argued that their inability to access the rental properties central 
to the initial claim amounted to discrimination and unjustly enriched the 
331. Stipulation of Dismissal at 1, Silber v. Airbnb, Inc., 2019 WL 3997098 (D. Del. 
Aug. 23, 2019), (No. 1:18-cv-01884-RGA), https://www.courtlist ener.com/recap
/gov.uscourts.ded.67050/gov.uscourts.ded.67050.18.0.pdf.
332. Update on Listings in Disputed Regions, AIRBNB (Apr. 9, 2019), 
https://press.airbnb.com/update-listings-disputed-regions/.
333. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶ 671 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997) (in which the Prosecutor argues in favor of a 
low threshold).
334. Airbnb’s subsequent decision to relist the properties may, however, alter such cate-
gorizations.
335. See Skinner, supra note 192, at 1845; see also Texas & Pac. Ry., Co. v. Behymer, 
189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903).
336. See, e.g. Israel: Airbnb to End Settlement Rentals, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 20, 
2018), https://www.hrw.org/ news/2018/11/20/israel-airbnb-end-settlement-rentals.
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plaintiffs.
337
The intervenors recalled that IHL provides the appropriate legal 
framework to assess the legality of the settlements but they primarily ad-
dressed the plaintiffs’ ownership claims.
338
Airbnb’s contribution was 
deemphasized and subsequently the intervenors’ petition was dismissed af-
ter the case settled.
339
IHL assumed but a small role within the ongoing de-
bate.
A human rights discourse was prioritized.
340
Yet despite this prevailing 
approach, Airbnb’s West Bank policy raises crucial considerations specific 
to IHL. The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights has asserted that:
Businesses play a central role in furthering the establishment, 
maintenance and expansion of Israeli settlements. They are in-
volved in constructing and financing settlement homes and support-
ing infrastructure, providing services to the settlements, and operat-
ing out of them. In doing so, they are contributing to Israel’s
confiscation of land, facilitate the transfer of its population into the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, and are involved in the exploitation 
of Palestine’s natural resources.
341
The IHL implications are explicit. The settlements themselves directly 
violate the Fourth Geneva Convention’s prohibition on the transfer of parts 
of an occupying power’s civilian population into the territory that it occu-
pies.
342
Settlements contribute to the occupation’s permanence. Under IHL, 
337. See Motion to Intervene on Behalf of Putative Intervenors and Counterclaim Plain-
tiffs Ziad Alwan, Village of Jalud, Municipality of ‘Anata, and Rada Wahbe and Memoran-
dum of Law in Support at 1–2, Silber v. Airbnb, Inc., 2019 WL 3997098 (No. 18-cv-01884-
RGA) (citing an Israeli Military Order prohibiting Palestinians in the West Bank from access-
ing the settlements).
338. See id.
339. Silber v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-01884-RGA, 2019 WL 3997098 (D. Del. Aug. 
23, 2019); see also Silber, et al. v. Airbnb, CTR. CONST. RTS. (Feb. 19, 2020), 
https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/silber-et-al-v-airbnb.
340. See Amnesty Int’l, Destination Occupation: Digital Tourism and Israel’s Illegal 
Settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories at 8, MDE 15/9490/2019 (2019), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2019/01/destination-occupation-digital-tourism-
israel-illegal-settlements/ (claiming that digital tourism companies operating in Israeli settle-
ments violate human rights law by contributing to and profiting from the maintenance of set-
tlements); see also Bed and Breakfast on Stolen Land, supra note 322, at 5 (in which Human 
Rights Watch and Kerem Navot state that online marketplaces contribute to the financial via-
bility of settlements); Sari Bashi, If the U.S. Government Won’t Act, Airbnb Will, FOREIGN 
POL’Y (Nov. 27, 2018), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/27/if-the-u-s-government-wont-
act-airbnb-will-west-bank-settlements-rentals-occupation-israel-palestinians-netanyahu/ (ex-
tending similar criticisms to other occupied territories including Northern Cyprus and Western 
Sahara).
341. U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Hu-
man Rights, ¶ 42, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/37/39 (Feb. 1, 2018) [hereinafter Report of the High 
Commissioner 2018].
342. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 83, art. 49(6).
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occupation is conceived as a temporary regime.
343
Temporality and the prin-
ciple of sovereign preservation provide the normative core of the law of oc-
cupation. Their maintenance is necessary to ensure an occupation regime’s
legitimacy.
344
Moral and legal liability is at its lowest ebb when corporate conduct af-
fects IHL incidentally. But the absence of moral opprobrium and explicit 
legal prohibitions are not commensurate with the significance of such forms 
of conduct. This detachment—between responses and effects—results from 
instances when the consequences of corporate conduct are insufficiently 
conceptualized. Under-theorization creates broad spaces in which the impli-
cations of various forms of corporate conduct occur beyond the reach of the 
prominent accountability frameworks. As these frameworks develop, it is 
necessary to further conceptualize the various ways that particular forms of 
business conduct can affect IHL’s foundational purpose.
It is, of course, an overstatement to imply that the settlements’ viability 
is contingent upon whether they may be listed on a particular website. The 
pertinent questions, from the perspective of IHL, should, however, concern 
the extent to which Airbnb’s business activities contribute to the settlement 
enterprise’s prolongment, to their normalization. Do they compromise the 
norms central to an occupation regime? Assessment will consider how Isra-
el, the occupying power, endeavors to generate tourism within and attract 
businesses to the settlements. Israel views its associated policies as a strate-
gic means of maintaining control of both the settlements and the West 
Bank.
345
Accordingly, ninety settlements are designated as “national priority are-
as.”
346
This enables the Government of Israel to provide financial entice-
ments to prospective businesses—both domestic and international—as a 
means of encouraging economic expansion into the nominated settle-
343. As per Article 42 of the Hague Convention, “territory is considered occupied when 
it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to 
the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.” See Hague 
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 42, 
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 539 T.S. 631. Further, Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion states that the “present Convention shall apply from the outset of any conflict or occupa-
tion mentioned in Article 2. In the territory of Parties to the conflict, the application of the 
present Convention shall cease on the general close of military operations.” See Fourth Gene-
va Convention, supra note 83,  art. 6.
344. See Hughes, supra note 321, at 156–57; see also AEYAL GROSS, THE WRITING ON 
THE WALL: RETHINKING THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION, 3–4 (2017).
345. Report of the High Commissioner 2018, supra note 341, ¶ 43; see also U.N. Hum. 
Rts. Council, Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusa-
lem, and in the Occupied Syrian Golan, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/34/39 (Feb. 27-Mar. 24, 
2017) [hereinafter Human Rights Council Report 2017].
346. Report of the High Commissioner 2018, supra note 341,  ¶ 43; see also Chaim Lev-
inson, Settlement Housing Gets Third of Israeli State Funds for ‘National Priority’ Areas,
HAARETZ (Jan. 21, 2015, 5:37 PM), https://www.haaretz.com /.premium-national-priority-
area-funds-go-to-settlements-1.5363270.
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ments.
347
Reductions in the price of land, development and infrastructure 





In 2016, Israel adopted a Resolution allocating NIS 5 
million to develop the West Bank’s tourism industry.
350
Further funds were 
earmarked to increase the development of tourist accommodation through-
out the West Bank. Yariv Levin, Israel’s Tourism Minister, announced: 
“After years of trying, for the first time today, the Ministry of Tourism will 
financially support the establishment of hotels and motels in Judea and Sa-
maria [West Bank]. Over the past few years, we have been witnessing the 
development of tourism in this region, many attractions were cultivated and 
a need to incentivize hotels has risen.”
351
The geographic footprint of Israel’s West Bank commercial activity 
now exceeds the total area of residential settlements.
352
A business entity
that, willingly or passively, contributes to annexationist objectives furthers 
the policies of an occupying power to assume permanent control, implicates 
IHL’s normative purpose. Yet these considerations are often absent from the 
resulting legal discourses. They remain untreated by the applicable legal 
frameworks. Legal mechanisms and due diligence processes increasingly 
reflect the extent to which corporations have become significant interna-
tional actors. They better understand how corporate behavior affects social 
goods and can threaten individual rights. As the accountability frameworks 
have developed, as corporations gain legal status, failure to fully conceptu-
alize both the nature of corporations and the extent of corporate operations 
within conflict areas creates these recurring instances. Through these in-
stances, the indelible consequences of corporate conduct, its broader effects, 
continue to elude accountability for activities that implicate international 
humanitarian law.
V. Conclusion
In 2007, the Association France Palestine Solidarité and the Palestine 
Liberation Organization filed a lawsuit against Veolia and Alstom. The 
347. Report of the High Commissioner 2018, supra note 341.
348. Id.; see also Occupation, Inc.: How Settlement Businesses Contribute to Israel’s
Violations of Palestinian Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www. hrw.org
/report/2016/01/19/occupation-inc/how-settlement-businesses-contribute-israels-violations-
palestinian.
349. See Who Profits, Touring Israeli Settlements: Business and Pleasure for The Econ-
omy of Occupation, 3–4 (Sept. 2017), https://whoprofits.org/flash-report/touring-israeli-
settlements-business-and-pleasure-for-the-economy-of-occupation/.
350. See Government Resolution 1561: Special Assistance for the Year of 2016 to Judea 
and Samaria, PRIME MINISTER’S OFF. (June 19, 2016), https://www.gov.il/he/Departments
/policies/2016_des1561, cited in Who Profits, supra note 349, at 3.
351. Who Profits, supra note 349, at 3.
352. Human Rights Council Report 2017, supra note 341, ¶ 24.
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plaintiffs argued that the French corporations violated international law 
when they joined a consortium to develop a light rail project in Jerusalem.
353
The tram’s route ran through West Jerusalem but would (and now does) in-
clude a number of stops in the city’s Eastern sector.
354
The route, the plain-
tiffs argued, permanently links the State of Israel with parts of the territory 
that it had occupied since 1967.
355
The Versailles Court of Appeal consid-
ered IHL’s application.
356
It recounted the various legal mechanisms and cit-
ed the relevant articles and sub-paragraphs that apply to occupied territo-
ry.
357
These were narrowly construed. They were held to apply solely to 
states.
358
Accordingly, the Court found that a French corporation could not 
be held liable for the alleged infringement of international norms as these 
impose obligations that are incumbent upon the occupying power alone.
359
Commentators queried the implications of the Court’s decision.
360
The 
case was read as a reversion to international law’s classic, state-centric, 
formulation. It would limit the forms of international legal accountability 
that can be extended to a corporation.
361
The decision indeed underappreci-
ates the progression of developments that have, since Nuremberg, extended 
international legal liability to corporations. However, the line of critical rea-
soning that followed from the decision portrays too narrow a conception of 
353. Jewish Telegraphic Agency, French Court: Jerusalem Rail Does Not Violate Inter-
national Law, HAARETZ (Apr. 28, 2013), https://www.haaretz.com/french-court-jerusalem-
light-rail-project-legal-1.5240009.
354. See Amina Nolte & Haim Yacobi, Politics, Infrastructure and Representation: The 
Case of Jerusalem’s Light Rail, 43 CITIES 28, 31 (2015).
355. Id. at 30, 35.
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accountability. The symbiotic relationship between international law, corpo-
rations, and accountability advances when law’s scope, purposes, and 
sources are understood broadly. It is only then that the range of corporate 
activities that impact norms enshrined in IHL in evolving and underexplored 
ways can be fully conceptualized.
Rosalyn Higgins identifies two notions of accountability. The first us-
age describes the process of determining formal guilt (i.e., demonstrating 
that an individual has the intention to perform an implicated act and/or the 
requisite mental capacity).
362
The second usage is preferable for current pur-
poses. Higgins explains that a broader notion of accountability implies that 
there is liability for internationally wrongful behavior and that that liability 
must be discharged.
363
Understanding accountability in its broadest sense—
as involving the justification of an actor’s conduct, assessing that conduct 
against predetermined standards, and imposing consequences when the ac-
tor fails to meet those standards—allows for assessments of legal frame-
works that are mindful of more than generalizable implementation and 
compliance challenges.
364
The case studies described in section IV of this article instead tell of 
particularities. They describe instances in which the absence of accountabil-
ity results from the misalignment between primary legal rules, the recog-
nized forms of implementation, and the nature of both corporations and their 
undertaken business activities. The case of Blackwater illustrates how a di-
rect violation by a corporation poses different accountability challenges that 
are exclusive to a corporation and that differ from those that are generally 
attributed to the non-compliant state. The case of Facebook demonstrates 
how emerging industries pose novel challenges that implicate IHL in previ-
ously unforeseen ways. And the case of Airbnb evidences corporate conduct 
that bears specific implications for IHL, for its normative purpose, that often 
go unconsidered when assessed through the prominent legal frameworks 
imposed to ensure accountability.
Corporations continue to gain international legal status. Regulatory re-
gimes are further developing. To fully realize the prevalence and nature of 
accountability gaps that remain undertreated through the application of the 
prominent legal frameworks, it is necessary to look beyond those instances 
when implementation fails or when narrow readings of law exclude particu-
lar actors. Better regulation necessitates broader conceptualization. We ask: 
Who is accountable? To whom are they accountable? And what are the 
standards against which accountability is assessed and implemented?
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In asking these questions we correctly assume that the norms prescribed 
within international humanitarian law remain vulnerable to various forms of 
corporate conduct. But responses to these challenges and efforts to engage 
with such questions of accountability must more fully reflect the particulari-
ties of the corporate form. They must more accurately account for the evolv-
ing nature of business conduct within conflict zones. The International 
Court of Justice, in the Reparations Advisory Opinion, pronounced that “the 
subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their na-
ture or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs 
of the community.”
366
If international law is to contribute to the process of 
narrowing accountability gaps, if it is to provide an agreeable and accurate 
vocabulary for determining standards and adjudging conduct, then regulato-
ry efforts must begin by embracing those features that differentiate the cor-
poration from those other entities that have traditionally held international 
law’s attention.
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